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Abstract 
 
For many years, scientists have been trying to implement human intelligence in 
machines without being able to make a complete model of human mind. Some people 
connect this failure to theorems proved by Kurt Gödel in 1931 and they are called 
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems. The results of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem 
caused many philosophical debates between the “believers” of Artificial Intelligence 
(A.I) and those who find it impossible. The purpose of this project is to examine how 
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems give rise to limits on the prospects of A.I. The 
main subject area of this report is Philosophy of Logic, yet the scope is somewhat 
extended to Mathematics and Computer Science. Arguments in this report are based 
on the book ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid’ by Douglas R. Hofstadter 
and the article ‘Minds, Machines and Gödel’ by J.R. Lucas. As Gödel’s 
Incompleteness Theorems apply to ‘formal systems’, we firstly spell out what the 
theorems state and how they work inside a formal system. Further more, arguments 
on possibilities of implementing human intelligence are presented. Since this project 
is set on a debatable subject, no concrete conclusion is made. 
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1. Introduction 
 
At the International Congress of Mathematics (ICM) in 1900 at Paris, a German 
mathematician named David Hilbert proposed a list of 23 unsolved mathematic 
problems (which became known as Hilbert’s problems). Out of the 23 problems, the 
second one was questioning whether the axioms1 of arithmetic are consistent, which 
means that there is no contradiction to their statements, and if so, whether their 
consistency can be proved. Hilbert tried to solve this problem using the method of 
absolute proof2. Despite all the efforts, no solution was ever reached. Though in 1931, 
an Austrian mathematician and logician named Kurt Gödel proved 2 theorems3 that 
showed the fact that no solution was found to Hilbert's second problem, was not 
coincidental. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems' outline was that powerful systems 
like arithmetic cannot prove their own consistency and we should always rely on 
stronger systems to prove their consistency. Gödel's results came up like a surprise to 
the world of mathematics at that period and they have made a great influence in 
mathematical logic. 
 
These two theorems are known as Gödel's Incompleteness theorems and they have the 
following statements: 
 
· Gödel's first incompleteness theorem states that there is no set of axioms of 
arithmetic that is both complete4 and consistent5. In other words it means that there is 
at least one true statement in the system that cannot be derived within the system. 
  
· Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem states that if we have a set of axioms T, 
then T's consistency cannot be proven within T. This theorem is basically the answer 
to Hilbert's second problem. With this theorem, Gödel managed to show that if we 
want to prove the consistency of a system like arithmetic, we have to rely on the 
consistency of a more powerful system than arithmetic, which is the opposite of what 
Hilbert was trying to prove using the method of absolute proof. 
 
Although this project is based on Philosophy of Logic and somewhat extended to 
Computer Science and Mathematics, we are mostly interested in influence of Gödel's 
theorems in the field of Artificial Intelligence (A.I).  A.I is the intelligence of 
machines, which is meant to be achieved by implementing the human logic in them. 
Until now, there has not been any (at least known) machine, which is intelligent 
enough to match human intelligence. But the question that arises here is; What is 
intelligence? A suitable meaning might be that intelligence is the ability to understand 
                                                
1 Axioms which are statements that cannot be derived by simpler rules but they are granted as true 
(“Gödel’s Proof” by Nagel and Newman. pg 4).. 
2 Absolute proof seeks the establishment of consistency of a formal system without relying on the 
consistency of another  formal system (“Gödel’s Proof” by Nagel and Newman. pg 26). 3 Theorems are propositions that are derived from the axioms of a system (“Gödel’s Proof” by Nagel 
and Newman. pg 5). 
4 A system is complete if its true statements written in its system notation can be proved to be theorems 
(“Gödel, Escher, Bach” by Hofstadter. pg 101). 
5 A system is consistent when there is an absence of contradiction of its axioms (“Gödel, Escher, 
Bach” by Hofstadter. pg 101). 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different problems and solve them, to understand languages, to reason, to learn and 
generally, to do all operations that require thinking. The problems can be different in 
complexity; from the problem of how to make a cup of coffee to the problem of 
solving a differential equation with multiple variables. The languages can also be 
different in vocabularies, expressions, sounds and writing. Reasoning can be varied 
depending on the situation where an intelligent being is involved. Generally, we can 
state that intelligence has very abstract meaning and it is difficult to find powerful 
enough words to describe it completely. So the question that conquers our curiosity is 
(as the question Allan Turing proposed in his paper ‘Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence’6) ── Can machines think? 
This question is extremely debatable and very difficult to express a concrete opinion 
at this stage of the report. This report will focus on the connection between Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem and A.I. and the reader will be guided through some 
fundamental notions that are essential in order to understand the philosophy behind 
Gödel's incompleteness theorems. We do not expect any prerequisite from the reader, 
thus we will attempt to provide all the information that will help to understand this 
report.  
 
                                                
6 Computing Machinery and Intelligence, A. M. Turing, Mind, New Series, Vol. 59, No. 236 (Oct., 
1950), pp.433-460  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 2. Problem Formulation 
 
The question that this report seeks answer to is; How does Gödel’s first 
Incompleteness Theorem give rise to limits on the prospects of Artificial 
Intelligence?   
 
 7 
3. Formal Systems 
 
One of the most central notions in Logic and Computer Science is that of a formal 
system. Why are formal systems so important for computers? Well, a computer itself 
is a big system or it is built on a system, more precisely, a formal system. In other 
words, computers are concrete instantiation of formal systems. Computers derive 
expressions or make decisions by using formal systems. A formal system consists of a 
formal language and a deductive system that contains a set of rules of inference 
and/or axioms. According to Douglas Hofstadter (writer of Gödel, Escher, Bach), the 
rules or restrictions of a formal system are the “Requirement of Formality”7. A formal 
system is used to derive one expression from its axioms and rules, which are 
previously expressed in the system.  A formal language is a set of words, which 
consists of finite strings of letters or symbols. 
 
Because it is similar to Gödel’s formal system, we would like to introduce a formal 
system called ‘MIU system’ from Hofstadter’s Gödel, Escher, Bach book. 
 
 
3.1 MIU-system 
 
Since this is a formal system, this system consists of some restriction or rules. Our 
formal system---MIU system--- consists of only three letters of alphabet: M, I, U. The 
strings (which mean strings of letters) of the MIU-system are the strings that are 
composed of only those three letters. For example: 
MU 
UIM 
MUUMUU 
UIIUMIUUIMUIIUMIUUIMUIIU   
are strings of the MIU-system. 
 
SYMBOLS: M, I, U 
AXIOM: MI 
RULES:  
              (In the following, x is merely a variable) 
1. If xI is a theorem, so is xIU.  
2. If Mx is a theorem, so is Mxx. 
3. In any theorem, III can be replace by U. 
4. UU can be dropped from any theorem. 
 
Now the question is—Can we produce a string, namely “MU” in this system? An 
axiom, namely “MI” is granted initially and we want to produce “MU” by using given 
axiom and rules as below: 
 
MI -…-…-…-…- MU 
 
The reason we want to do is that we want to find out “MU” is derivable or not 
mathematically.  
                                                
7 From ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ by Douglas Hofstadter, page 33. 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In order to derive MU from MI, we need to annihilate all the I’s from our string by 
using the given rules. When we check the rules, only rule number 2 and rule number 3 
affect the I-count8, by lengthening and shortening respectively. Note that the axiom 
MI has I-count 1.  
 
When we look at rule number 3, it eliminates the I-count by exactly 3(three 
consecutive I’s). By rule number 3, the I-count output can be a multiple of 3but 
only if the I-count input was a multiple of 3 as well. It means that rule number 3 can 
create a multiple of 3 only if it began with a multiple of 3. In general, rule number 3 
applies only to the I-count that is a multiple of 3 and thus it has the property, which is 
a multiple of 3.  
 
Concerning rule number 2, it doubles the I-count. The axiom MI has I-count 1 and 
using rule number 2 we can get an I-count, which has always the property of being a 
multiple of 2. So, this property will be preserved always using rule number 2. But 
what we are trying to derive is MU, which has the property of being a multiple of 3 
(since it has no I’s and the only way we can achieve this is by using rule number 3). It 
follows that using rule number 2 we will never manage to get an I-count, which is a 
multiple of 3. 
 
To Sum it all up9: 
1) The I-count begins at 1 (not a multiple of 3). 
2) Rules 1 and 4 do not affect the I-count at all. 
3) Rules 2 and 3 affect the I-count in such a way that they never create a multiple of 3       
unless given one initially. 
 
It follows that the I-count can never be a multiple of 3 and thus we can never derive 
MU from MI. In other words, “MU is not a theorem of the MIU- system”10. 
 
As a result, we can see that ‘MU’ actually exists in the system, but it is not derivable. 
So the system is incomplete. This corresponds to Gödel’s first incompleteness 
theorem which says “there is at least one true statement in any formal system, but 
it cannot be derived or proved”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                8 The number of I’s in any string. 9 Taken from ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ by Douglas Hofstadter, page 261. 10 Taken from ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ by Douglas Hofstadter, page 261. 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3.2 Typographical Number Theory (TNT) 
 
In this section, another formal system called TNT will be presented to the reader. 
Douglas Hofstadter introduced TNT in his book; Gödel, Escher, Bach an Eternal 
Golden Braid. Hofstadter used this formal system to describe natural numbers11 (so 
TNT inherits the properties of natural numbers) and further on to explain Gödel's 
Incompleteness Theorems. Our goal here is to summarize TNT and then use it to 
present Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem.  
 
As a starting point, the language of TNT has to be defined: 
 
 
Numerals 
 
In order to avoid describing every natural number with a unique symbol, Hofstadter 
uses only two symbols to describe them, namely “S” and “0”. “0” stands for the 
number zero, while “S” stands for the sentence “the successor of...” So examples for 
representing natural numbers in TNT are the following: 
 
Zero: 0 
One: S0 (the successor of zero) 
Two: SS0 (the successor of the successor of zero) 
Seven: SSSSSSS0 (the successor of the successor of the successor.....of zero) 
 
 
Variables 
 
To describe variable, the first five letters of the English alphabet are used, namely a, 
b, c, d, e and the symbol “ ' “ (prime) which can be added to next to one of the letters 
in order to construct a new variable. Examples of variables are the following: 
 
a 
b 
c' 
c'' 
e''''''' 
d 
d'''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' 
 
 
Operators 
 
To describe addition, multiplication, equivalency and negation, the operators “+”, “·”, 
                                                11 Natural numbers in mathematics is the set of positive integers and zero; N= {0, 1, 2, 3,…, n}. The properties of natural numbers are examined in the number theory. 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“=” and “~” are used respectively. Also, parenthesizing will be used. Some examples 
of using operators are the following: 
 
“One plus one”: (S0 + S0) 
“One plus one plus two”: (S0 + (S0 + SS0)) 
“One plus two time six”: (S0 + (SS0 · SSSSSS0)) 
“One plus one is equal to two”: S0 + S0 = SS0 
“One plus one is not equal to three”: ~ (S0 + S0) = SSS0 
 
 
Propositional Symbols 
 
All the symbols of propositional calculus have the same meaning in TNT as well. 
Some examples of using propositional symbols and atoms12 are the following: 
 
“ if a equals a' , then a' equals a” : (a=a'⊃a'=a) 
“ if a is not equal to a' and b is equally to a', then a is not equal to b” : 
((~(a=a')^(b=a'))⊃(~(a=b))  
 
 
Free variables and Quantifiers 
 
The property of well-formed formulae is that their interpretations are statements, 
which are either true or false. However, there are also well-formed formulae, which 
do not have such property. For example: 
  
“b plus 1 equals 3”: (b + S0) = SSS0 
 
Since the variable b is undefined, the statement above is neither true nor false. 
Because the variable b is undefined, it is called a free variable. Because no truth-value 
can be assigned, such a formula is called open formula. 
 
An open formula can be changed to a closed formula by using a quantifier. In TNT, 
two quantifiers are used, namely, “∀” and “∃”, which stand for “for every...” and 
“there exists …” respectively. The use of quantifiers is important in our formulae, 
because quantifiers can set “limits” to the formulae by changing them from open 
formulae to closed formulae. Some examples of formulae using quantifiers (closed 
formulae) are: 
 
“There exists a number b such that b plus 1 equals 3”: ∃b: (b + S0) = SSS0 
“For all numbers b, b plus 1 equals 3”: ∀b: (b + S0) = SSS0 
 
It is very clear that the language of TNT is more complicated than the language of 
MIU. The next step is to present the axioms and the rules of TNT: 
 
                                                
12 Atoms represent propositions, for instance: in ((~(a=a')^(b=a'))⊃(~(a=b))  
 (a=a’) is an atom. 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TNT’s Axioms 
 
TNT has 5 axioms:13 
 
1. ∀a: ~Sa = 0 
2. ∀a: (a + 0) = a 
3. ∀a: ∀b: (a + Sb) = S(a + b) 
4. ∀a: (a ⋅ 0) = 0 
5. ∀a: ∀b: (a ⋅ Sb) = ((a ⋅b) + a) 
 
 
TNT’s Rules14 
 
RULE OF SPECIFICATION: Suppose u is a variable, which occurs inside the string 
ϕ. If the string ∀u: ϕ is a theorem, then so is ϕ, so are any strings made from ϕ by 
replacing u, whenever it occurs, by one and the same term. 
(Restriction: The term which replaces u must not contain any variable that is 
quantified in ϕ.) 
∀a: ~Sa = 0  axiom 1 
       ~S0 = 0  specification  
 
RULE OF GENERALIZATION: Suppose ϕ is a theorem in which u, a variable, 
occurs free. Then ∀u: ϕ is a theorem.  
 
RULE OF INTERCHANGE: Suppose u is a variable, then the string ∀u: ~ and ~∃ u: 
are interchangeable anywhere inside any theorem. 
∀a: ~Sa = 0  axiom 1 
~∃a: Sa = 0  interchange 
 
RULE OF EXISTENCE: Suppose a term (which may contain variables as long as 
they are free) appears once, or multiply, in a theorem. Then any (or several, or all) of 
the appearances of the term may be replaced by a variable which otherwise does not 
occur in the theorem, and the corresponding quantifier must be placed in front. 
∀a: ~Sa = 0  axiom 1 
∃b: ∀a: ~Sa = 0 existence  
 
RULES OF EQUALITY:  
   (In the following, r, s and t all stand for arbitrary terms.          
   SYMMETRY: If r = s is a theorem, then so is s = r.  
   TRANSITIVITY: If r = s and s = t are theorems, then so is s = t. 
 
RULES OF SUCCESSORSHIP:  
   ADD S: If r = t is a theorem, then Sr = St is a theorem. 
   DROP S: If Sr = St is a theorem, then r = t is a theorem. 
 
                                                13 The axioms are taken from ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ p.216 14 The rules are taken from ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ p.217‐ 219. 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RULE OF INDUCTION: Suppose u is a variable, and Φ{u} is a well-formed formula 
in which u occurs free. If both ∀u: <Φ{u} ⊃ Φ{Su/u}15> and Φ{0/u} are theorems, 
then ∀u: Φ{u} is also a theorem. 
 
 
3.3 Gödel Numbering and TNT 
 
Kurt Gödel used a clever technique to make formal systems that refer to arithmetic to 
“talk” about themselves (self-reference). He assigned every single piece in the 
language of the formal system a unique natural number, called Gödel number. In this 
way, the formulae of the formal system can be rewritten with a natural number and 
this natural number will be called Gödelian number of the formula. In this way he 
achieved to get a natural number to speak about natural number. To illustrate this 
technique and also use it to describe self-reference and Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorem, TNT will be coded with numbers16: 
 
Symbol Code Number 
0 666 
S 123 
= 111 
+ 112 
⋅ 236 
( 362 
) 323 
< 212 
> 213 
a 262 
‘ 163 
∧ 161 
∨ 616 
⊃ 633 
~ 223 
∃ 333 
∀ 626 
: 636 
 
Using this code numbers, formulas of TNT can be reformed in a way that they 
became natural numbers. Here are some examples of these transformations: 
 
626,262,636,362,262,112,666,323,111,262 axiom 2 
 ∀     a      :     (      a     +     0     )     =     a 
 
362,262,111,262,163,633,262,163,111,262,323 
  (      a     =     a      '     ⊃     a     '      =     a     ) 
 
                                                
15 Φ{Su/u} stands for every occurrence of u replaced by Su in Φ. And the same holds for Φ{0/u}. 
16 The symbols and the code numbers of the table are taken from Hofstadter’s ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ p.268 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626,262,636,362,262,112,666,323,111,262 is a natural number which represents a 
formula of TNT, which refers to natural numbers. So using this method, self-reference 
is achieved17. It has to be clarified that the actual Gödel’s coding was more 
complicated and advanced, but still, there is freedom in choosing the code numbers 
that are wished.  
 
 
3.4 Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem in terms of TNT (part 1) 
 
(Please note that this session is merely a preliminary sketch of the next session.) 
In terms of TNT, Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem states that TNT is incomplete; 
this means that there is at least one formula of TNT that is true but cannot be derived 
in the system.  
 
First, we would like to present a derivation, given in austere TNT18:  
 
626,262,636,626,262,163,636,362,262,112,123,262,163,323,111,123,362,262,112,262,163,323                   axiom3 
 ∀     a     :      ∀    a      ‘     :      (      a     +     S    a      ‘      )     =     S     (      a     +    a     ‘     )  
626,262,163,636,362,123,666,112,123,262,163,323,111,123,362,123,666,112,262,163,323                  specification 
  ∀     a     ‘      :     (      S     0    +     S     a     ‘      )     =     S     (     S      0    +     a     ‘     )  
362,123,666,112,123,666,323,111,123,362,123,666,112,666,323                                                            specification 
  (     S     0     +     S     0     )     =     S     (     S     0      +    0     )  
626,262,636,362,262,112,666,323,111,262                                                                                                       axiom2 
  ∀    a      :     (      a     +     0     )     =     a  
362,123,666,112,666,323,111,123,666                                                                                                      specification  
  (      S    0     +     0     )      =    S     0  
123,362,123,666,112,666,323,111,123,123,666                                                                                            insert 123 
  S    (      S     0     +     0     )      =     S    S    0  
362,123,666,112,123,666,323,111,123,123,666                                                                                           transitivity 
  (     S     0     +     S     0     )     =     S     S    0  
 
In the above derivation, 362,123,666,112,123,666,323,111,123,123,666 is obtained by 
using TNT‘s axioms and rules and hence it is called producible number or more 
precisely; TNT-number. So 362,123,666,112,123,666,323,111,123,123,666 is a TNT-
number. On the other hand, 123,666,111,666 (which represents S0 = 0) is not a TNT-
number19. It can be expressed by some string/formula of TNT with one free variable, 
say a. So: 
 
“a is not a TNT-number.” 
 
If every occurrence of a in this string/formula is replaced by the TNT-numeral for  
123,666,111,666 a numeral with 123,666,111,666 S’s we will get a TNT-
string/formula which can be translated on two levels. The first-level meaning will be: 
 
“123,666,111,666 is not a TNT-number.” 
 
And as TNT-numbers links to the theorems of TNT, the second-level meaning will be: 
 
“S0 = 0 is not a theorem of TNT.” 
 
                                                
17 The reason we need self-reference is; we want a formal system that talks about itself. 
18 Taken from ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ p.269. 
19 The proof can be seen in ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ p.220. 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Now, we can use the predicatenamely; “is not a theorem of TNT.”in TNT to    
talk about TNT. 
 
Our purpose is that, we want to find a string/formula in TNT (we will call this 
string/formula ‘G’), which talks about itself, namely: 
 
“G is not a theorem of TNT.”    (or)    “I am not a theorem of TNT.”  
 
We will spell out how G is created and some important concepts of TNT in the next 
session. Furthermore, we will (a bit surprisingly) find out in the next session that the 
string/formula “G is not a theorem of TNT.” is G itself.  
 
For now, just because we want to foresee (somewhat superficially) the consequences 
of finding G, let’s question ourselves is the statement; “G is not a theorem of TNT.” 
true? 
 
If the statement is false, then G is a theorem in TNT. But TNT is consistentwhich 
means that it does not produce any false statementso the statement is true. Since the 
statement is true, G is not a theorem of TNT. Now, we can clearly see that there is 
string/formula in TNT, which expresses a true statement in TNT, yet the 
string/formula is not a theorem. Thus, TNT is incomplete.  
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3.5 Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem in terms of TNT (part 2) 
 
In this session we show a more technical approach20 to Gödel’s first incompleteness 
theorem in terms of TNT. According to Hofstadter, there are two key ideas in Gödel’s 
proof that are the core of the proof. More precisely, he writes in his book: 
“…I will stress two key ideas which are the core of the proof. The first key idea is the 
deep discovery that there are strings of TNT, which can be interpreted as speaking 
about other strings of TNT; in short, that TNT, as a language, is capable of 
“introspection”, or self-scrutiny. This is what comes from Gödel-numbering. The 
second key idea is that the property of self-scrutiny can be entirely concentrated into a 
single string; thus that string’s sole focus of attention is itself…”21   
 
 
Proof-Pairs 
 
Until now we have showed how formulae of TNT can be coded up in Gödel numbers, 
so we have achieved a natural number to talk about natural numbers. Here, we will 
code up whole derivations of formulae in order to create Proof-Pairs. A Proof-Pair 
consists of two natural numbers a and a’, where a is the Gödel number of the 
derivation of a formula that has Gödel number a’22.  The property of being a Proof-
Pair is important, because this way we can make strings/formulae of a formal system 
(from now on we will talk about TNT, since that is the one we want to put our focus 
on)  “talk” about other strings/formulae of TNT. This leads to the fact that we can 
express this property (of being a proof pair) in TNT with a formula with two free 
variables a and a’. We can write the following abbreviation:  
 
TNT-PROOF-PAIR {a, a’} 
  
The interpretation is: 
 
“a is the Gödel number of  a proof of a formula whose Gödel number is a’.“ 
                                                
20 Taken from chapter XIV in Hofstadter’s ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ book. Page 438 
21 Taken from Hofstadter’s ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ book. Page 438 from the session ‘The Two Ideas of 
the “Oyster” ‘ 
22 In order to make this clearer to the reader, an example using MIU will be presented here (taken from 
page 439 in ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’). Our purpose is to show how the natural numbers a and a’ can be 
created. So first we have to set up code numbers to the symbols of MIU, which luckily has only three 
symbols M, I and U. Using the same coding as Hofstadter does in chapter IX in his book, we have: 
M 3 
I 1 
U 0 
So in order to derive for example, MUI from the axiom MI and the rules of the 
system, the derivation is the following: 
MI  31 
MII  311 
MIIII  3111 
MUI  301 
By putting all the Gödel numbers of the derivation steps next to each other, we get the Gödel number a 
of the derivation of MUI equal to 3131131111301. The Gödel number a’ of the derived theorem MUI 
is 301. 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If a and a’ is a valid proof pair, then it means that if we take a and translate back to 
TNT notation, we will see how a theorem of TNT with Gödel number a’ is derived. 
  
So the first key idea of “introspection” of TNT is achieved by Proof-Pairs. The next 
step to the second key idea is to create a notion that “allows the concentration of this 
introspection into a single formula.“23. As first step to achieve this, Hofstadter uses a 
relation called Substitution in his book. 
 
 
Substitution 
  
The idea of Substitution is to see what happens in the Gödel number of a formula 
when its free variables are replaced by specific numerals. The reason to do this is to 
see the relationship between the Gödel number of the first formula with the free 
variables, the numeral that is plugged in the free formula and the Gödel number of the 
formula with the plugged numeral. In order to illustrate this better, a simple example 
taken from the ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ book will be presented: 
 
We have the formula a=a with Gödel number 262,111,262. If we substitute the free 
variable a with the numeral 2 (SS0), we get a new formula, namely SS0=SS0. This 
new formula has Gödel number 123,123,666,111,123,123,666.  
 
Substitution is primitive recursive24, so it can be represented by a formula of TNT 
with three free variables a, a’ and a’’ and has the following abbreviation: 
     
SUB {a, a’, a’’} 
 
The interpretation is:  
 
“By substituting the numeral a’ into the formula whose Gödel number is a, we get a 
new formula whose Gödel number is a’’. 
 
Using TNT-PROOF-PAIR and SUB, we are now able to define the notion of 
arithmoquining. 
 
 
Arithmoquining 
 
Our general purpose is to create a string/formula that “says”: “This string/formula is 
not a TNT-theorem” (we will refer to this as G). In order to do that, we will try first to 
combine the two notions that were presented before, namely TNT-PROOF-PAIR and 
SUB. More precisely, we would like to examine what happens when the Gödel 
number of a formula is plugged in as substitution numeral inside the formula itself. 
Using again an example taken from ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ book, we will make it 
clearer to the reader: 
 
                                                
23 Taken from Hofstadter’s ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ book, page 443. 
24 See ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ book, page 440- 441. 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We have the formula a=S0 that has Gödel number 262,111,123,666. Plugging 
262,111,123,666 into a=S0, we get 262,111,123,666=S0 or better 
SSSSSS......SSSS0=S0, where in the left had term we have 262,111,123,666 S’s. As 
we see this formula is FALSE.  
  
In this case, it can be easily seen that we have a case of substitution where two 
variables are the same (and they are the Gödel number of the formula we have before 
substitution). So it can be written as SUB {a’’, a’’, a’}. This is called Arithmoquine. 
Hofstadter uses the following abbreviation to define this operation: 
     
ARITHMOQUINE {a’’, a’} 
 
The interpretation is: 
  
“a’ is the arithmoquinification of a’’ “ 
  
The next clever trick we need to do in order to get G is to Arithmoquine an 
Arithmoquined formula. The formula we need is described by the following formula: 
~∃a:∃a’:<TNT-PROOF-PAIR{a,a’}∧ARITHMOQUINE{a’’, a’}>25 
 
If we code up this formula, we will get a huge Gödel number that we will call u (u is a 
numeral with many S’s). As we see, this formula has only one free variable, namely 
a’’. So the only thing we need to do now is to Arithmoquine this particular formula by 
plugging in its Gödel number u in its free variable a’’: 
 
~∃a:∃a’:<TNT-PROOF-PAIR{a,a’}∧ARITHMOQUINE{u, a’}> 
 
What we have now is actually the formula G! 
 
The next two steps we need to take are to find G’s Gödel number and to see what G 
“says”. 
 
We can find G’s Gödel number easily just by checking how G was created. We create 
G by arithmoquining; 
   
~∃a:∃a’:<TNT-PROOF-PAIR{a,a’}∧ARITHMOQUINE{a’’, a’}>. 
  
This formula has Gödel number u, so this leads to the fact that G’s Gödel number is 
the arithmoquinification of u. 
 
To see what G really “says”, we need to make a step-by-step interpretation of it’s 
meaning. The actual meaning of G by translating its symbols is: 
 
“It is not the case that, there exist numbers a and a’ such that both, they are a TNT- 
proof-pair and a’ is the arithmoquinification of u.” 
 
But it is obvious that a’ is the arithmoquinification of u, so it must be the case that a 
and a’ are not a TNT-proof-pair. So we can rephrase G into: 
                                                
25 Taken from Hofstadter’s ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ book. Page 446.  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“There is no number a that can make a TNT-proof-pair with a’, which is the 
arithmoquinification of u.” 
 
Since a and a’ are not a proof pair, it means that a’ is not a theorem in TNT (at least a 
provable theorem). So we can write that G “says”: 
 
“ The formula that whose Gödel number is the arithmoquinification of u is not a 
theorem of TNT.26” 
 
But as mentioned before, G’s Gödel number is the arithmoquinification of u. So the 
formula is G itself and what G really “says” is:  
 
“ G is not a TNT-theorem” 
 
Then we can make the same observation of the validness of G as we did in the 
previous session; ‘Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem in terms of TNT (part 1)’ and 
it results to the fact that TNT is incomplete. 
                                                
26 Taken from Hofstadter’s ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ book. Page 447. 
 19 
3.6 TNT can never be complete 
 
So until now we have proved that there is a true sentence G of TNT that cannot be 
proved inside TNT. So TNT is incomplete. A clever thing to ask is; what about if we 
add G into TNT’s axioms? Is TNT going to be complete after doing such an 
operation? Well, if we do the same operation as in the previous session, we will still 
see that TNT is incomplete. 
 
Let’s assume that we manage to “capture” G and add it into TNT’s axioms. We will 
end up with a new formal system TNT+G. Same as before, we can Arithmoquine an 
Arithmoquined formula, which is:  
 
~∃a:∃a’:<(TNT+G)-PROOF-PAIR{a,a’}∧ARITHMOQUINE{a’’, a’}> 
 
This formula has Gödel number u’ and a free variable a’’. By inserting u’ into a’’ we 
get the following formula: 
 
~∃a:∃a’:<(TNT+G)-PROOF-PAIR{a,a’}∧ARITHMOQUINE{u’, a’}> 
 
This formula, we will call it G’, “says” the same thing as G, but it “talks” about 
TNT+G: 
 
“ G’ is not a (TNT+G)-theorem.” 
 
It is very clear, that even if we add G’ into TNT+G, there will be a new formula G’’ 
that is not provable in TNT+G+G’ and so on. But a new question can be raised here. 
The method we used to prove the existence of G’ was the same method we used to 
prove the existence of G and it will be the same for proving the existence of G’’ and 
G’’’ and so on. So how about adding an axiom schema to TNT instead of adding one 
axiom at a time? Hofstadter calls this axiom schema as “Gω” in his ‘Gödel, Escher, 
Bach’. So the question is; Will TNT be complete if Gω is added as its axioms? 
Unfortunately, the answer to this is still no27. The reason is, as he writes, “Gω was not 
clever enough to foresee its own embeddability inside number theory”28. 
 
As general result, it should be clear to the reader, that there will be always a true 
statement of TNT that cannot be proved inside TNT. This means that TNT can never 
be complete. 
                                                
27 The argument can be seen on Hofstadter’s ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ book. Page 468. 
28 Taken from Hofstadter’s ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ book. Page 468. 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4.Lucas’ Argument in “Minds, Machines and Gödel”  
 
John Randolph Lucas is a philosopher, who argued against the possibility of 
mechanizing human intelligence with his “Minds, Machines and Gödel” (MMG) 
paper. The paper was published in 1961. Since then, many philosophers and 
academics have argued against MMG paper, because they found some weaknesses in 
Lucas’ argument. In this session, we will try to show the philosophical matters that 
were raised in MMG paper and in counter arguments to MMG paper. “Minds, 
Machines and Gödel” is a Gödelian argument, which means that the main argument 
that is used in this paper is Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. This makes it a very 
interesting paper to be studied in our report.  
 
The way “Minds, Machines and Gödel” is written, is quite puzzling and contains 
unclear arguments and implicit assumptions. Regarding this report, we will first try to 
point out some premises in Lucas’ paper that are connected to the previous sessions of 
the report, and then show some counter arguments that have been raised from other 
philosophers against these premises.  
 
As starting point, we can say that Lucas builds his argument by arguing about 3 
different subjects: 
 
1) The nature of the machines. 
2) The existence of the Gödelian formula G. 
3) The consistency of machines. 
 
In the following text, we will describe more detail about how Lucas argues in these 
three subjects, and we will present some of the texts from his original paper in order 
to point out to the reader the places where we found Lucas’ premises.  
The way Lucas argues about the nature of the machines is pretty clear: he argues that 
the actions take by machines are based on formal systems, which means that Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems can be applied to them. Already from the beginning of his 
paper, he writes: 
 
 “Gödel's theorem must apply to machines, because it is the essence of being a machine, that it should 
be a concrete instantiation of a formal system.”29 
 
In this report, we have sketched that a formal system consists of a finite set of 
symbols, axioms and rules. So, in a way, we can state that machines are something 
finite and definite. In his paper Lucas argues that since machines are finite, which also 
makes the number of their actions finite, so there must be things that they can never 
do. More specifically his writes: 
 
“Our idea of a machine is just this, that its behaviour is completely determined by the way it is made 
and the incoming "stimuli": there is no possibility of its acting on its own: given a certain form of 
construction and a certain input of information, then it must act in a certain specific way. We, however, 
shall be concerned not with what a machine must do, but with what it can do.”30 
                                                29 “Minds, Machines and Gödel” by J.R. Lucas. (Appendix pg. 39) 30 “Minds, Machines and Gödel” by J.R. Lucas. (Appendix pg. 40) 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He also argues that we can even construct a machine that has randomizing device. In 
this way Lucas tries to annihilate possible counter-arguments to his argument. One of 
the strongest proposals in the creation of “intelligent” machines is the creation of a 
machine with a randomizing device. By the term of randomizing device, he means the 
possibility of choosing between alternative ways of proving statements. Though, he 
argues that still these alternatives will be finite and since they are finite, the machine 
will still be finite, and these alternatives should not lead to contradictions. He 
highlights this by saying: 
 
 
“But clearly in a machine a randomizing device could not be introduced to choose any alternative 
whatsoever: it can only be permitted to choose between a number of allowable alternatives…Any 
randomizing devices must allow choices only between those operations which will not lead to 
inconsistency: which is exactly what the relaxed specification of our model specifies Indeed, one might 
put it this way: instead of considering what a completely determined machine must do, we shall 
consider what a machine might be able to do if it had a randomizing device that acted whenever there 
were two or more operations possible, none of which could lead to inconsistency.”31 
 
We can sum up and say that until now we have a premise that concerns the nature of 
machines, and this premise is: 
 
Machines are concrete instantiations of formal systems, which makes Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems applicable to them (even if they contain randomizing 
devices). 
 
Lucas’ next premise, which is actually the core of his Gödelian argument, is the 
existence of the Gödelian formula G. As shown previously in this report, in formal 
systems that are strong as TNT, there is always a formula G that is un-provable inside 
the system. Lucas argues that since machines are instantiations of formal systems, 
there should be at least one formula G, that machines cannot accept it as true since it 
cannot be derived inside their system, but the human mind can see it as true. He 
builds this argument first by writing about the existence of G: 
 
“We now construct a Gödelian formula in this formal system. This formula cannot be proved-in-the- 
system. Therefore the machine cannot produce the corresponding formula as being true. But we can see 
that the Gödelian formula is true: any rational being could follow Gödel's argument, and convince 
himself that the Gödelian formula, although unprovable-in-the-system, was nonetheless----in fact, for 
that very reason---true. Now any mechanical model of the mind must include a mechanism which can 
enunciate truths of arithmetic, because this is something which minds can do: in fact, it is easy to 
produce mechanical models which will in many respects produce truths of arithmetic far [259] better 
than human beings can. But in this one respect they cannot do so well: in that for every machine there 
is a truth which it cannot produce as being true, but which a mind can. This shows that a machine 
cannot be a complete and adequate model of the mind”32 
 
He states that the machine cannot derive the formula G, because the machine is 
definite. Obviously, this is not a rigorous argument, since the first question that comes 
to someone’s mind is; what about if we indentify the formula G and add in the 
machine’s axioms? Lucas’ argues that even if we manage to construct a machine 
which can produce a Gödelian formula as being true, there will be another Gödelian 
                                                31 “Minds, Machines and Gödel” by J.R. Lucas. (Appendix pg. 40) 32 “Minds, Machines and Gödel” by J.R. Lucas. (Appendix pg. 41) 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formula which the machine cannot produce as being true, and if we construct another 
second machine which can see those two hitherto Gödelian formulae as true, there 
still will be another Gödelian formula which our second machine cannot produce as 
being true and so on. Therefore, Lucas says; “the machine will still not be a complete 
and adequate model of the mind”. 
 
Lucas added that we are trying to construct a mechanical mind, which is “dead”, but 
human mind is “alive” and mind can go one better than any formal, dead system can.  
Lucas believes that the mind always has the last word because of the Gödel’s 
theorem.  
 
Lucas asserts his opinion by saying that: 
 
“…construct a second, more adequate, machine, in which the formula can be produced as being true. 
This they can indeed do: but then the second machine will have a Gödelian formula all of its own, 
constructed by applying Gödel's procedure to the formal system which represents its (the second 
machine's) own, enlarged, scheme of operations. And this formula the second machine will not be able 
to produce as being true, while a mind will be able to see that it is true. And if now a third machine is 
constructed, able to do what the second machine was unable to do, exactly the same will happen: there 
will be yet a third formula, the Gödelian formula for the formal system corresponding to the third 
machine's scheme of operations, which the third machine is unable to produce as being true, while a 
mind will still be able to see that it is true. And so it will go on. However complicated a machine we 
construct, it will, if it is a machine, correspond to a formal system, which in turn will be liable to the 
Gödel procedure [260] for finding a formula unprovable-in-that- system.”33  
 
He also mentions the fact that the construction of G is a standard procedure: it means 
that a new machine can be possibly constructed, where the standard procedure 
(Gödelizing operator) is included in the machine’s axioms, so the machine can 
identify any new Gödelian formulas and accept them as true. Lucas argues again that 
the new machine with the Gödelizing operator will still be incomplete and a new G 
formula will exist for the new system. More specifically, he writes:    
 
  “…for the machine with a Gödelizing {49} operator, as we might call it, is a different machine from 
the machines without such an operator; and, although the machine with the operator would be able to 
do those things in which the machines without the operator were outclassed by a mind, yet we might 
expect a mind, faced with a machine that possessed a Gödelizing operator, to take this into account, 
and out-Gödel the new machine, Gödelizing operator and all. This has, in fact, proved to be the case. 
Even if we adjoin to a formal system the infinite set of axioms consisting of the successive Gödelian 
formulae, the resulting system is still incomplete, and contains a formula which cannot be proved-in-
the-system, although a rational being can, standing outside the system, see that it is true.”34 
 
Another remarkable argument in Lucas’ paper is, that there is a possibility for the 
machine with the Gödelizing operator, to accept the contradiction of G, so the system 
will be inconsistent: 
 
“It cannot accept all unprovable formulae, and add them to its axioms, or it will find itself accepting 
both the Gödelian formula and its negation, and so be inconsistent. Nor would it do if it accepted the 
first of each pair of undecidable formulae, and, having added that to its axioms, would no longer regard 
its negation as undecidable, and so would never accept it too: for it might happen on the wrong 
member of the pair: it might accept the negation of the Gödelian formula rather than the Gödelian 
formula itself.”35 
                                                33 “Minds, Machines and Gödel” by J.R. Lucas. (Appendix pg. 42) 34 “Minds, Machines and Gödel” by J.R. Lucas. (Appendix pg. 42) 35 “Minds, Machines and Gödel” by J.R. Lucas. (Appendix pg. 44) 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He also mentions the fact that machines are deductive, while human mind is not 
always deductive. So in order to create a machine that can simulate human mind 
entirely, it needs a way; an inductive way of reasoning in some cases.   
Hence, in a few words we can define Lucas’ premise about the existence of an 
unprovable in-the-system formula G: 
 
There exists always a Gödelian formula G, which machines cannot see as true 
but the human mind can. And even if we can create a more advanced machine 
(one that contains a Gödelizing operator), there will still exist a formula G that 
this machine cannot see as true.  
 
The last area that Lucas argues about is regarding the consistency of machines. 
Generally, Lucas states that machines are consistent. Actually, he does not state that 
clearly, but taking as a fact the first premise that we presented that Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorems must apply to machines, and also the fact that he writes that; 
“Gödel's theorem applies only to consistent systems…”, we can clearly make the 
previous conclusion. A consistent machine means that a machine which never 
produces contradictions. In other words, we can say that a consistent machine is an 
infallible machine (a machine that does not make mistakes). But now there are two 
matters that Lucas argues about.  
 
First, he argues about the consistency of human mind. Because if human mind is 
inconsistent, then in order to mechanize human mind entirely, we have to create 
something inconsistent as well. But as mentioned before, Gödel’s incompleteness 
theorems are applicable only to consistent systems. In any case, Lucas argues that 
human mind is consistent and these inconsistencies that it produces sometimes, are 
similar to the malfunctioning of machines.  
 
The second thing he argues about is the ability of human mind to refer to itself. He 
writes in his paper: 
 
 “a machine, if consistent, cannot produce as true an assertion of its own consistency: hence also that a 
mind, if it were really a machine, could not reach the conclusion that it was a consistent one. For a 
mind which is not a machine no such conclusion follows “ 36 
 
Lucas interprets Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem as the consistency of a 
system cannot be proved in the system, but there is no objection to going outside the 
system and produce informal arguments for the consistency. Even though it would be 
the best if we can formalize them, it does not mean that we have to drop our informal 
true statements just because we cannot formalize them. This means that sometimes, 
consistency in a system has to be accepted, even if it cannot be proved formally. 
Therefore, J.R. Lucas argues that it is proper and reasonable for a mind to assert its 
own consistency. Machines however cannot go outside the system and do the same. 
Furthermore, Lucas distinguishes between human beings and machines by saying that 
 
 “a conscious being can deal with Gödelian questions in a way in which a machine cannot, because a 
conscious being can both consider itself and its performance and yet not be other than that which did 
the performance. A machine can be made in a manner of speaking to "consider" its own performance, 
but it cannot take this "into account" without thereby becoming a different machine, namely the old 
                                                36 “Minds, Machines and Gödel” by J.R. Lucas. (Appendix pg. 47) 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machine with a "new part" added. “37 
 
It follows that conscious being can handle self-referring Gödelian formulae such as 
“This formula is unprovable in the system.”, but machines cannot. 
 
So we can state in a few words Lucas’ argument about the consistency of machines: 
 
Machines are consistent (which can be interpreted as machines are infallible) but 
they lack self-reference, which is something that human mind has since it has the 
ability of jump out of its system and refer to itself. 
 
The conclusion to Lucas’ premises is that human mind cannot be modeled as a 
machine, simply because machines (in fact their corresponding formal systems) are 
not tantamount to human mind. 
 
At the end, J.R. Lucas also refers to complexity of systems. He argues that if a mind 
can be simulated by a system, then it can be done only by a very complex system. 
This may lead to the fact that the machine will act on its own and has a mind of its 
own, which we can recognize as ''intelligent''. But if this is achieved, then it is no 
longer a machine---- it is a mind. At the end, J.R. Lucas concludes that '' There is no 
arbitrary bound to scientific enquiry: but no scientific enquiry can ever 
exhaust the infinite variety of the human mind''.  
                                                37 “Minds, Machines and Gödel” by J.R. Lucas. (Appendix pg. 48) 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5.David Lewis’ Counter-Argument  
 
David Lewis argued against Lucas’ with his “Lucas against Mechanism” paper that 
was published in 1969. In his paper, Lewis restates Lucas’ argument in such way to 
define what he called “Lucas arithmetic”, which contains the ordinary rules of 
inference and an additional rule R (“infinitary rule of inference” as he called it) that 
will be defined later in this session. Then Lewis argues that the weakness in Lucas’ 
argument is that Lucas cannot verify theoremhood in Lucas’ arithmetic.  
 
In the beginning, Lewis restates Lucas’ argument. First, he makes a metalinguistic 
reasoning about a sufficient formalization L of the language of arithmetic and a 
function Con from machine tables to L. He makes the following reasoning38: 
 
C1. Whenever M specifies a machine whose potential output is a set S of 
sentences, Con (M) is true if and only if S is consistent. 
C2. Whenever M specifies a machine whose potential output is a set S of true 
sentences, Con (M) is true. 
C3. Whenever M specifies a machine whose potential output is a set S of sentences 
including the Peano axioms39, Con (M) is provable form S only if S is consistent. 
 
Afterwards, he defines ϕ1: 
 
Call ϕ a consistency sentence for S if and only if there is some machine table M such 
that ϕ, Con (M) and S is the potential output of the machine whose table is M. 
 
This way, he can define rule R, which (in Lewis’ opinion) Lucas defends: 
 
 If S is a set of sentences and ϕ is a consistency sentence for S, infer ϕ from S. 
 
Then Lewis continues by stating that R is a perfectly sound rule and R is only used to 
perform an inference in L. Furthermore, he continues by introducing the notion of 
Lucas arithmetic. As starting point, he says that Lucas accepts Peano’s axioms as true. 
So he writes “a sentence ψ is a theorem of Peano's arithmetic if and only if ψ belongs 
to every superset of the axioms, which are closed under the ordinary rules of logical 
inference”. In the case of Lucas arithmetic, a sentence χ will be a theorem if and only 
if it belongs to the superset of the axioms that are closed under the ordinary rules of 
inference and rule R as well. So he concludes that we should accept theorems of 
Lucas’ arithmetic as true, since we accept theorems of Peano’s arithmetic as true, and 
this way Lucas is able to produce any theorem of Lucas arithmetic as true. 
Afterwards, Lewis assumes that Lucas arithmetic is the potential output of a 
Turing machine. This means that the machine will contain a consistency sentence 
ϕ, which would a theorem of Lucas arithmetic since Lucas arithmetic is closed 
under R. So, the sentence χ of Lucas arithmetic would be provable in Lucas 
arithmetic and then according to C3, Lucas arithmetic would be inconsistent. 
This means, “if Lucas arithmetic is the potential output of Lucas, then Lucas is 
                                                
38 Taken from “Lucas against Mechanism”. (Appendix pg. 52) 
39 The reader can find more explicit information about Peano’s axioms in Hofstadter’s “Gödel, Escher, 
Bach” on pg. 216-217.   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no machine.”  
  
In order to conclude the restatement of Lucas’ argument, Lewis explains one 
more step. Lewis says that Lucas has good reason to believe that all the theorems 
that he produces in Lucas arithmetic are true, but this does not mean that Lucas’ 
output is the whole Lucas arithmetic. Because it might be the case that Lucas 
produces a sentence that he cannot verify to be a theorem of Lucas arithmetic. 
So, Lewis says that Lucas output might be the output of a suitable machine. 
Lewis argues that if Lucas wants to prove that he is no machine, then he has to be 
able to verify theoremhood in Lucas arithmetic. This is Lewis’ counter-argument, 
namely, that Lucas’ cannot verify theoremhood in Lucas arithmetic.  
 
Lewis believes that Lucas is unable to verify theoremhood in Lucas arithmetic. 
The reason is that the proofs of Lucas arithmetic theorems “are transfinite 
sequences of sentences since Lucas’s rule R can take an infinite set S of 
premises”. He continues by stating that even finite proofs in Lucas arithmetic and 
the use of rule R, cannot be checked by a mechanical procedure, which will 
“decide whether a given finite set S of sentences was the output of a machine 
with a given table M”. Lewis continues by arguing that this procedure can be 
easily generalized to decide whether “a Turing machine will halt on any given 
input”. But he states that the generalization of such a method is impossible. 
At the end, Lewis makes the following conclusion: 
 
 “We do not know how Lucas verifies theoremhood in Lucas arithmetic, so we do 
not know how many of its theorems ha can produce as true. He can certainly go 
beyond Peano arithmetic, and he is perfectly justified in claiming the right to do 
so. But he can go beyond Peano's arithmetic and still be a machine, provided 
that some sort of limitations on his ability to verify theoremhood eventually leave 
him unable to recognise some theorem of Lucas arithmetic, and hence 
unwarranted in producing it as true.”40 
                                                40 Taken from “Lucas against Mechanism”. (Appendix pg. 53-54) 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6.David Coder’s Counter-Argument 
 
David Coder raised another counter-argument to Lucas’ paper in his “Gödel’s 
Theorem and Mechanism” paper.  
 
Coder starts up his argument by saying that he agrees with Lucas that machines 
cannot simulate human mind but he argues that it is not because of Gödel’s theorem. 
In his opinion, Gödel’s theorem only proves that machines cannot represent all minds.  
Coder bases his argument in the following text in Lucas’ paper: 
 
“Gödel’s theorem must apply to cybernetical machines, because it is of the essence of being a machine, 
that it should be a concrete instantiation of a formal system. It follows that given any machine which is 
consistent and capable of doing simple arithmetic, there is a formula which it is incapable of producing 
as being true - i.e., the formula is unprovable in-the-system - but which we can see to be true. It follows 
that no machine can be a complete or adequate model of the mind, that minds are essentially different 
from machines.”41 
 
Coder states: “if minds are essential different from machines, then no mind is 
machine-like”. Both parts of this proposition are true but, according to Coder, Lucas 
fails to prove either of this. Coder proposes an example of a man who is intelligent 
enough to make deduction from the axioms of some system of number theory, but this 
man cannot see the Gödelian formula no matter how much he tries. In this way, Coder 
has shown that machines can do what this man can do. So according to Coder, Lucas 
has not shown that minds are essential different from machines. Then he also puts 
down another example, which has the same result.    
 
Coder also believes that Lucas’ argument gives the wrong impression that if nobody 
can do arithmetic operations except by sorting out proofs from non-proofs of a set of 
proofs, then a machine can represent this actual behavior. Then he writes that what 
makes something a machine is that it operates an algorithm, no matter which way it 
operates this algorithm. And the way it operates this algorithm is mechanically. This 
makes an algorithm, a mechanical procedure. 
 
Coder also points out that the term “mechanical” as mathematical term has been 
misunderstood in Lucas’ argument. He states that the word “mechanical” as a 
mathematical concept means: “the instructions given by a Turing algorithm do not at 
any step leave open the next step in the calculation”. But human do not operate 
mechanical, since human can make mistakes or start calculations from the beginning. 
He states that Lucas, in Coder’s opinion, has misunderstood the word mechanical 
since Lucas thinks that a machine can only calculate according to mechanical 
procedures. Then he writes:  
 
“But either this leaves out of account the fact that one important part of something’s 
being a machine is that its construction determines its operation; or the mathematical 
definition of “Turing machine” requires that the behaviour of whatever operates a 
Turing algorithm is determined by its construction.”42  
 
He states that he believes that this is false, where on the other hand; Lucas thinks that 
                                                41  “Minds, Machines and Gödel” by J.R. Lucas. (Appendix pg. 39) 42  “Gödel’s Theorem and Mechanism” by David Coder. (Appendix pg. 57) 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this is true. At the end, Coder concludes that Lucas thinks that the reason why 
machines cannot simulate human mind is that human are not restricted in doing 
arithmetic according to mechanical procedures. But at the very end of his paper he 
writes;  
 
“But this fact loses all importance once we see that even if we could do arithmetic in 
no other way, it would not follow that our behaviour, in doing arithmetic, was 
determined by our “construction” and “input” “43 
                                                43 “Gödel’s Theorem and Mechanism” by David Coder. (Appendix pg. 58) 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7. J.R. Lucas’ reply To David Lewis and David Coder 
 
After Lewis’ and Coder’s counter-arguments against Lucas’ paper, J.R. Lucas replied 
to them with his paper “Lucas against Mechanism: a rejoinder”.  
 
In the beginning of this paper, Lucas argues against Lewis’ argument. Lucas states 
that he bases his Gödelian argument in one fact; That Mechanism’s claim is universal, 
namely that all minds can be represented by machines. A single counter-argument 
against this claim can prove mechanism false. And this is what Lucas tried to do with 
his “Minds, Machines and Gödel” paper. He argues particularly that he does not need 
the whole Lucas arithmetic to prove the falsity of Mechanism, but only a single 
theorem that he can see as true but a machine cannot see as true. And Lucas used 
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem to prove that such a theorem exists in Lucas 
arithmetic. He also points out that to be human is not only about doing things that 
human have done, but to be able to do other things that are unspecified. So, for a 
machine to be tantamount to human mind it needs to have potentiality to do things a 
mind could do and not only things a mind has done.  
 
Lucas also comments on Lewis’ restatement of Lucas’ argument, where Lewis 
defined Lucas arithmetic which includes the “infinitary rule of inference” R. Lucas 
admits that he is not very happy with the term “infinitary rule of inference” and the 
reason is, as he writes; “the whole point of conducting our inferences by rules is that 
the rule should be definite and finite”. He argues that the rule R is also a significant 
difference between minds and machines, because even minds that cannot follow 
Gödel’s proof can accept rule R, and then their arithmetic lies within Lucas’ 
arithmetic and so they are not machines. He also referred to Coder about this matter, 
because Coder argued that Lucas had proved that machines couldn’t simulate only 
“high-powered” mathematicians’ minds.  
 
Furthermore, Lucas argues about Coder’s complain that Lucas’ Gödelian argument is 
unnecessary. He refers to that part where Coder argued that Lucas had misunderstood 
the word “mechanical”. Lucas argues that he does not think of being unable to 
calculate mechanically is a sufficient condition for being a machine, but it is a 
necessary one. He states that even if human mind calculate according to a 
”mechanical” procedure, this still does not make it able to be represented by a 
machine; it is human reasoning that it cannot be represented by a mechanical 
procedure, and that is the reason for a machine to be unable to simulate the human 
mind. 
 
Lucas makes the conclusion that maybe his Gödelian argument is unnecessary, since 
there are also many other reasons that can prove that human mind cannot be simulated 
by a machine. But he states that his argument is a “reductio ad absurdum” (proof by 
contradiction), and as he writes; “The merit of the Gödelian argument is that this 
reductio is itself by means of inescapable logical arguments to a position which even 
a tough-mind philosopher must admit to be absurd”.  
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8. Hofstadter’s Counter-Argument 44 
 
In this session, we will present one of the arguments, which Hofstadter made in his 
book ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’, concerning Lucas’ ‘Mind, Machines and Gödel’ paper. 
 
Hofstadter starts out by quoting the first sentence from Lucas’ paper: 
 
“Gödel's theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds cannot be explained 
as machines.” 
 
Hofstadter interprets as Lucas is saying that computers cannot do “Gödelization45” 
in the manner that human can. It is because as we explained in session 3.4 – 3.6, there 
will be at least one true formula that TNT, or even TNT+G and so on cannot derive. 
Hence, it is impossible to write a program to do “Gödelization” in the manner that 
human can.  
 
But he does not agree with Lucas. He doubts that we human can ourselves do 
“Gödelization” in every case. In order to do “Gödelization”, we need to know how to 
do it in any particular case. The more formal systems (or programs) become complex, 
the more difficult it will be for us to do “Gödelization”. So we will reach to a point 
that we cannot describe how to “Gödelize” in algorithmic way. If we cannot describe 
explicitly how to do it in all cases, we will eventually face some very complicated 
case that we cannot figure out how to do “Gödelization”.  Of course the ability to do 
“Gödelization” can be different from person to person. But at some point, any human 
being will inevitably reach the limits of his/her own ability to do “Gödelization”.  
Hofstadter concludes his counter argument by saying “From there on out, formal 
systems of that complexity, though admittedly incomplete for the Gödel reason, will 
have as much power as that human being.” 
                                                
44 Hofstadter’s arguments can be seen on ‘Gödel, Escher, Bach’ book. Page 471- 477. 
45 A term used by Lucas in ‘Mind, Machines and Gödel’ paper. 
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9.Alan Mathison Turing’s Point of View 
 
In this session, we will present some of the A. M. Turing’s arguments from his paper 
‘COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE’.  
 
Turing did not believe that, there are limitations to the power of machines but no such 
limitations to the human intellect. In other words, he did not believe that human are 
infallible. Because we human also give wrong answers to questions or make mistakes.  
 
Furthermore, he stated that “there might be men cleverer than any given machine, but 
then again there might be other machines cleverer again, and so on.”46. His statement 
can be interpreted as; Even if a machine cannot do something a human can, there 
might be another machine which can do everything that the former machine can, plus 
it can do the thing that the former machine cannot, plus it can do something which the 
human cannot and so on.  
 
In his paper, Turing included a statement from a memoir by Lady Lovelace (1842), 
namely: "The Analytical Engine has no pretensions to originate anything. It can do 
whatever we know how to order it to perform"47 (her italics). Then, Turing quoted 
another statement by Hartree (1949) who added: "This does not imply that it may not 
be possible to construct electronic equipment which will 'think for itself,' or in which, 
in biological terms, one could set up a conditioned reflex, which would serve as a 
basis for 'learning.' Whether this is possible in principle or not is a stimulating and 
exciting question, suggested by some of these recent developments but it did not seem 
that the machines constructed or projected at the time had this property."48 Turing 
mentioned clearly that he agreed with Hartree and proposed a very challenging idea 
so-called “learning machines”.  
 
Turing proposed that instead of trying to produce a program/machine to simulate the 
adult mind, we could rather try to produce one, which simulates the child’s. The 
reason he gave is that because there is so little mechanism in the child brain, which 
makes it easier to be programmed. Then his idea is to educate the child machine. He 
estimated that the amount of work in the education process would be approximately 
as much as for the human child. 
 
Turing divided the problem in making “learning machines” into two parts, namely: 
‘the child program’ and ‘the education process’, which are closely connected. He said 
that we couldn’t expect to get a good child machine at the first attempt. We must do it 
in experimenting waywe produce one such machine and see how well it learns from 
teaching, then try to produce a better one and so on.  
 
Turing proposed that a simple child machine could be programmed on “punishment 
and rewards principle” “The machine has to be so constructed that events which 
                                                
46 Taken from ‘COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE’ session 6. (3) The 
Mathematical objection. (Appendix pg. 71-72) 
47 Taken from ‘COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE’ session 6. (6) Lady Lovelace's 
Objection. (Appendix pg. 75-76) 
48 Taken from ‘COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE’ session 6. (6) Lady Lovelace's 
Objection. (Appendix pg. 75-76)  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shortly preceded the occurrence of a punishment signal are unlikely to be repeated, 
whereas a reward signal increased the probability of repetition of the events which led 
up to it.”49 He annotated that he actually had done some experiments and succeeded in 
teaching a few things to a child machine. But he did not consider the experiment as 
really successful, because the teaching method was too unorthodox.   
 
However, he added that it is necessary to have some “unemotional” channels of 
communication in the child machine. It is because the child machine should not feel 
it, even if it had to learn something through some tedious tasks. Then, it is possible to 
teach the child machine to obey orders given in some for instance a symbolic 
language by using these “unemotional” channels.  
 
The ways to make a child machine may vary from a simple system with general 
principles to a complex system of logical inference “built in”. Turing explained 
further that in the latter case, there would be large amount of definitions and 
propositions involved. There would be various kinds of status in the propositions, for 
example, well-established facts, conjectures, mathematically proved theorems, 
statements given by an authority etc. “Certain propositions may be described as 
"imperatives." The machine should be so constructed that as soon as an imperative is 
classed as "well established" the appropriate action automatically takes place.”50 
 
Turing also suggested putting a random element in a learning machine. A solution of 
some problem can be search rather efficiently by using a random element. Suppose 
for instance we wanted to find a number between 50 and 200, which was equal to the 
square of the sum of its digits. We could do it in two wayseither we start at 51 then 
try 52 and go on until we got a number that worked (or) we choose numbers at 
random until we got a good one. The latter way is rather efficient if there are several 
solutions. 
 
Turing’s paper seems to us that he is saying: A.I is a matter of complexity in 
programming. Thus, various possible ideas should be tried. He wrapped up the article 
by saying: 
 
“We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be 
done.”51 
 
  
 
 
                                                
49 Taken from ‘COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE’ session 7. Learning Machines. 
(Appendix pg. 79-83) 
50 Taken from ‘COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE’ session 7. Learning Machines. 
(Appendix pg. 79-83) 
51 Taken from ‘COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE’ session 7. Learning Machines. 
(Appendix pg. 79-83) 
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10.Discussion/Conclusion 
 
For this project, our question was; 
 
How do Gödel’s first Incompleteness Theorem give rise to limits on the prospects of 
Artificial Intelligence? 
 
In general terms, we must admit that we find Lucas’ Gödelian argument valid and 
interesting. As Lucas pointed out in his reply to Lewis and Coder, the claim of 
Artificial Intelligence is that all minds can be represented by machines. By using the 
Gödelian argument, he showed that there is at least one thing that can prove the claim 
of A.I. false. But still, we can make some objections to his argument. 
 
Throughout the whole MMG paper, Lucas argued that machines cannot represent 
human mind, but he did not explained what the human mind is. If the only difference 
between human and machines is the fact the human can see the Gödelian formula as 
true but machines cannot, then only a very small percentage of human minds cannot 
be represented by machines. In fact, Lucas argument misses the part where he has to 
explain the claim of A.I. in detail and Lucas has to make clear what he considers as 
human mind. Perhaps we can restate A.I.’s claim as following: 
 
Different machines can represent all different minds. 
 
This way Lucas’ argument loses its power, since representing a non-high-powered 
mathematicians mind is very possible. So, as Turing proposed in his paper, it is a 
matter of complexity of systems. 
 
Then we can put up a question; is being able to identify the Gödelian formula 
essential in representing human intelligence? We can say that in our opinion, 
identifying the Gödelian formula is not that important as being able to know the 
whole procedure for constructing it. In “Minds, machines and Gödel”, Lucas has 
stated that this procedure is standard and represent-able by machines, but the problem 
is that a new Gödelian formula will always exist. But in any case the same thing can 
happen for human beings, but with the difference that human will stop using this 
procedure at a point because human can identify, by jumping out of the system, that 
this procedure leads to infinity, so there is no reason for repentance. A machine will 
stick on adding the new Gödelian formula all the time.  This way, we can say that we 
agree with David Coder, who believed that the Gödelian argument is not a strong 
reason for proving Mechanism false. 
 
At the end, our last objection is regarding the consistency of human mind. Allan 
Turing argued that human are inconsistent but Lucas argued that this inconsistency is 
similar to malfunctioning of machines. But we rather find Turing’s argument valid 
than Lucas’. Because human mind may “receive” some information wrong, for 
example if someone gives us wrong information about some mathematical truth (e.g. 
the derivative of 2x is x), then the whole human reasoning is changing and may 
become inconsistent. Machines on the other hand are programmed by human beings 
to give only consistent answers and these human beings have to be sure that their 
programming is consistent. In a few words, human nature is different from machines 
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and our reasoning can be easily misleading, while the reasoning of machines is 
something more concrete and standard.  
 
Rounding up everything, we can say that Gödel’s Incompleteness theorems are some 
concrete proof of something that cannot be represented by machines but this does not 
make A.I. unachievable. Of course it gives rise to some limits, namely to simulate a 
high-power mathematician such as Kurt Gödel, but still nothing is impossible. Maybe 
we human need to know everything about human mind first, and then try to represent 
it in a machine. Because until today, human are still unaware of their potential brain 
power, and it is essential in programming to know everything about the problem you 
are trying to solve.  
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11.Appendix 
  
11.1 Propositional Calculus/ Logic  
 
In logic, a proposition is a declarative sentence, which is either true or false but not 
both.   (A declarative sentence is a sentence that declares a fact). For example,  
1. Copenhagen is the capital of Denmark. 
2. 1 + 1 = 2  
3. 1 + 2 = 4 
4. How old are you? 
5. x + 1 = 2 
 Sentences 1, 2 and 3 are propositions. More over, sentences 1 and 2 are true but 
sentence 3 is false. Sentences 4 and 5 are not proposition, because they are neither 
true nor false. Sentence 5 can be turned into a proposition if we assign a value to the 
variable. The letters p,q,r,s,t,….are used conventionally, for propositional variables. If 
a proposition is true, then it has the truth value T(true) and if  it is false, then it has the 
truth value F(false). Propositional calculus or Propositional Logic is the area of logic 
that deals with propositions.  
 
Definition 1: If x is a proposition, then the negation of x, denoted by ¬x has the 
opposite truth values of x.  
The truth table for the negation of a proposition: 
x ¬x 
T F 
F T 
 The table is inspired from Kenneth H. Rosen “DISCRETE MATHEMATICS AND ITS 
APPLICATIONS” page.3 
 
Definition 2: If x and y are propositions, then the conjunction of x and y, denoted by       
x Λ y (the proposition “x and y”) is true when both x and y are true and otherwise it is 
false.  
 
The truth table for the conjunction of two propositions: 
x y x Λ y 
T T T 
T F F 
F T F 
F F F 
The table is inspired from Kenneth H. Rosen “DISCRETE MATHEMATICS AND ITS 
APPLICATIONS” page.4 
Definition 3: If x and y are propositions, then the disjunction of x and y, denoted by 
x V y (the proposition “x or y”) is false when both x and y are false and otherwise it is 
true.  
 
The truth table for the disjunction of two propositions: 
x y x V y 
T T T 
T F T 
F T T 
F F F 
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The table is inspired from Kenneth H. Rosen “DISCRETE MATHEMATICS AND ITS 
APPLICATIONS” page.4  
 
  
Definition 4: If x and y are propositions, then the conditional statement “if x, then y”, 
denoted by x → y is also a proposition. x → y is false when x is true and y is false, 
and true otherwise. Here, x is called hypothesis, antecedent or premise and y is called 
conclusion. 
  
 The truth table for the conditional statement x → y: 
x y x → y 
T T T 
T F F 
F T T 
F F T 
The table is inspired from Kenneth H. Rosen “DISCRETE MATHEMATICS AND ITS 
APPLICATIONS” page.6  
 
Compound Propositions 
 
Compound propositions are the propositions made up of basic propositions. For 
example; 
(x V ¬y) → (x Λ y)  
 
The truth table of (x V ¬y) → (x Λ y): 
x y ¬y x V ¬y x Λ y  (x V ¬y) → 
(x Λ y) 
T T F T T T 
T F T T F F 
F T F F F T 
F F T T F F 
The table is inspired from Kenneth H. Rosen “DISCRETE MATHEMATICS AND ITS 
APPLICATIONS” page.10 
 
Tautology, Contradiction and Contingency 
 
 A compound proposition that always is true is called tautology. A 
compound proposition which is always false is called contradiction. A compound 
proposition which is neither true nor false is called contingency. 
 
Well-Formed Formulae 
 
Basic Step: T, F and x(a propositional variable) are well-formed formulae. 
Recursive Step: If A and B are well-formed formulae, then the followings are also 
well-formed formulae. 
¬A 
A Λ B 
A V B 
A → B 
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Rules of Inference for Propositional Logic 
 
The tautology (x Λ (x → y) ) → y is the basic rule of inference known as modus 
ponens. The following is the table for the Rules of Inference: 
 
Rule of Inference Tautology Name 
x 
x → y 
y 
[x Λ (x → y)]→ y Modus ponens 
¬y 
x → y 
¬x 
[¬y Λ (x → y)]→ ¬x 
 
 
Modus tollens 
x → y 
y → z 
x → z 
[(x → y) Λ (y → z)] → (x 
→ z) 
Hypothetical syllogism 
x V y 
¬x 
y 
[(x V y) V ¬x] → y Disjunctive syllogism 
x 
x V y 
x → (x V y) Addition 
x Λ y 
x  
(x Λ y) → x Simplication 
x 
y 
x Λ y 
[(x) Λ (y) → (x Λ y) Conjunction 
x V y 
¬x V z 
y V z 
[(x V y) Λ (¬x V z)] → (y V 
z) 
 
Resolution 
The table is inspired from Kenneth H. Rosen “DISCRETE MATHEMATICS AND ITS 
APPLICATIONS” page. 66. 
 
 
Tautology and Completeness 
 
A compound proposition that is always true is called tautology. For example, observe 
the truth table for the following compound proposition: 
 
x ¬x x V ¬x 
T F T 
F T T 
  
As you can see, the compound proposition x V ¬x is always true, no matter what one 
of the propositions in it is true or false. This type of compound proposition is called 
‘tautology’. 
 
Furthermore, observe the following; 
if      φ → ψ  
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and   ψ → θ  then we can derive  
that   φ → θ  
 
Similarly,  
if        φ → (φ Λ φ)  
and     (φ Λ ψ) → ψ   then we can derive  
that     φ → ψ 
  
If a form is derivable, then it is ‘tautology’. This theorem is called ‘soundness’. On 
the contrary, if a form is tautology, then it is derivable. This theorem is called 
‘completeness’. 
 
However, Gödel’s theorem says, any system you can come out with, there are some 
true formulae but they are not derivable. 
 
Consistency 
 
As we have mentioned in the introduction, a system that does not contain conflicting 
requirements (which can be used to derive a contradiction) is ‘consistent’. For 
example, observe the following system specifications.  
 
“Incoming emails are stored in the server or they are transmitted.” 
“Incoming emails are not stored in the server.” 
“If incoming emails are stored in the server, then they are transmitted.” 
 
Let x denote “Incoming emails are stored in the server” and let y denote “Incoming 
emails are transmitted”. The specifications can be rewritten as:  
x V y  
¬x  
x → y  
 
If all of the above specifications are true, then the system is consistent. Otherwise, it 
is not. In order to find out, we can make the following table.  
 
x y x V y ¬x x → y 
T T T F T 
T F T F F 
F T T T T 
F F F T T 
 
Hence, we can conclude that, the system is consistent. However, if we add a new 
specification; namely, ¬y (“Incoming emails are not transmitted”) to the above 
system, then the system will be inconsistent. It can be seen easily in the following 
new table. 
 
x y x V y ¬x x → y ¬y 
T T T F T F 
T F T F F T 
F T T T T F 
F F F T T T 
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11.2 J.R. Lucas’ “Minds, Machines and Gödel” 
 
First published in Philosophy, XXXVI, 1961, pp.(112)-(127); reprinted in The 
Modeling of Mind, Kenneth M.Sayre and Frederick J.Crosson, eds., Notre Dame 
Press, 1963, pp.[269]-[270]; and Minds and Machines, ed. Alan Ross Anderson, 
Prentice-Hall, 1954, pp.{43}-{59}. 
Gödel's theorem seems to me to prove that Mechanism is false, that is, that minds 
cannot be explained as machines. So also has it seemed to many other people: almost 
every mathematical logician I have put the matter to has confessed to similar 
thoughts, but has felt reluctant to commit himself definitely until he could see the 
whole argument set out, with all objections fully stated and properly met.1 This I 
attempt to do. 
Gödel's theorem states that in any consistent system which is strong enough to 
produce simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot {44} be proved-in-the-
system, but which we can see to be true. Essentially, we consider the formula which 
says, in effect, "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system". If this formula were 
provable-in-the-system, we should have a contradiction: for if it were provablein-the-
system, then it would not be unprovable-in-the-system, so that "This formula is 
unprovable-in-the-system" would be false: equally, if it were provable-in-the-system, 
then it would not be false, but would be true, since in any consistent system nothing 
false can be provedin-the-system, but only truths. So the formula "This formula is 
unprovable-in-the-system" is not provable-in-the-system, but unprovablein-the-
system. Further, if the formula "This formula is unprovablein- the-system" is 
unprovable-in-the-system, then it is true that that [256] formula is unprovable-in-the-
system, that is, "This formula is unprovable-in-the-system" is true. 
The foregoing argument is very fiddling, and difficult to grasp fully: it is helpful to 
put the argument the other way round, consider the possibility that "This formula is 
unprovable-in-the-system" might be false, show that that is impossible, and thus that 
the formula is true; whence it follows that it is unprovable. Even so, the argument 
remains persistently unconvincing: we feel that there must be a catch in it somewhere. 
The whole labour of Gödel's theorem is to show that there is no catch anywhere, and 
that the result can (113) be established by the most rigorous deduction; it holds for all 
formal systems which are (i) consistent, (ii) adequate for simple arithmetic---i.e., 
contain the natural numbers and the operations of addition and multiplication---and it 
shows that they are incomplete--- i.e., contain unprovable, though perfectly 
meaningful, formulae, some of which, moreover, we, standing outside the system, can 
see to be true. 
Gödel's theorem must apply to cybernetical machines, because it is of the essence of 
being a machine, that it should be a concrete instantiation of a formal system. It 
follows that given any machine which is consistent and capable of doing simple 
arithmetic, there is a formula which it is incapable of producing as being true---i.e., 
the formula is unprovable-in-the-system-but which we can see to be true. It follows 
that no machine can be a complete or adequate model of the mind, that minds are 
essentially different from machines. 
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We understand by a cybernetical machine an apparatus which performs a set of 
operations according to a definite set of rules. Normally we "programme" a machine: 
that is, we give it a set of instructions about what it is to do in each eventuality; and 
we feed in the initial "information" on which the machine is to perform its 
calculations. When we {45} consider the possibility that the mind might be a 
cybernetical mechanism we have such a model in view; we suppose that the brain is 
composed of complicated neural circuits, and that the information fed in by the senses 
is "processed" and acted upon or stored for future use. If it is such a mechanism, then 
given the way in which it is programmed---the way in which it is "wired up"---and the 
information which has been fed into it, the response---the "output"---is determined, 
and could, granted sufficient time, be calculated. Our idea of a machine is just this, 
that its behaviour is completely determined by the way it is made and the incoming 
"stimuli": there is no possibility of its acting on its own: given a certain form of 
construction and a certain input of information, then it must act in a certain specific 
way. We, however, shall be concerned not with what a machine must do, but with 
what it can do. That is, instead [257] of considering the whole set of rules which 
together determine exactly what a machine will do in given circumstances, we shall 
consider only an outline of those rules, which will delimit the possible responses of 
the machine, but not completely. The complete rules will determine the operations 
completely at every stage; at every stage there will be a definite instruction, e.g., "If 
the number is prime and greater than two add one and divide by two: if it is not prime, 
divide by its smallest factor": we, however, will consider the possibility of there being 
alternative instructions, e.g., "In a fraction you may divide top and bottom by any 
number which is a factor of both numerator and denominator". In thus (114) relaxing 
the specification of our model, so that it is no longer completely determinist, though 
still entirely mechanistic, we shall be able to take into account a feature often 
proposed for mechanical models of the mind, namely that they should contain a 
randomizing device. One could build a machine where the choice between a number 
of alternatives was settled by, say, the number of radium atoms to have disintegrated 
in a given container in the past half- minute. It is prima facie plausible that our brains 
should be liable to random effects: a cosmic ray might well be enough to trigger off a 
neural impulse. But clearly in a machine a randomizing device could not be 
introduced to choose any alternative whatsoever: it can only be permitted to choose 
between a number of allowable alternatives. It is all right to add any number chosen at 
random to both sides of an equation, but not to add one number to one side and 
another to the other. It is all right to choose to prove one theorem of Euclid rather than 
another, or to use one method rather than another, but not to "prove" something which 
is not true, or to use a "method of proof" which is not valid. Any {46} randomizing 
devices must allow choices only between those operations which will not lead to 
inconsistency: which is exactly what the relaxed specification of our model specifies 
Indeed, one might put it this way: instead of considering what a completely 
determined machine must do, we shall consider what a machine might be able to do if 
it had a randomizing device that acted whenever there were two or more operations 
possible, none of which could lead to inconsistency. 
If such a machine were built to produce theorems about arithmetic (in many ways the 
simplest part of mathematics), it would have only a finite number of components, and 
so there would be only a finite number of types of operation it could do, and only a 
finite number of initial (115) assumptions it could operate on. Indeed, we can go 
further, and say that there would only be a definite number of types of operation, and 
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of initial assumptions, that could be built into it. Machines are definite: anything 
which was indefinite or infinite we [258] should not count as a machine. Note that we 
say number of types of operation, not number of operations. Given sufficient time, 
and provided that it did not wear out, a machine could go on repeating an operation 
indefinitely: it is merely that there can be only a definite number of different sorts of 
operation it can perform. 
If there are only a definite number of types of operation and initial assumptions built 
into the system, we can represent them all by suitable symbols written down on paper. 
We can parallel the operation by rules ("rules of inference" or "axiom schemata") 
allowing us to go from one or more formulae (or even from no formula at all) to 
another formula, and we can parallel the initial assumptions (if any) by a set of initial 
formulae ("primitive propositions", "postulates" or "axioms"). Once we have 
represented these on paper, we can represent every single operation: all we need do is 
to give formulae representing the situation before and after the operation, and note 
which rule is being invoked. We can thus represent on paper any possible sequence of 
operations the machine might perform. However long, the machine went on 
operating, we could, give enough time, paper and patience, write down an analogue of 
the machine's operations. This analogue would in fact be a formal proof: every 
operation of the machine is represented by the application of one of the rules: and the 
conditions which determine for the machine whether an operation can be performed 
in a certain situation, become, in our representation, conditions which settle whether a 
rule can be applied to a certain formula, i.e., formal conditions of applicability. Thus, 
construing our rules as rules of inference, we shall have a proof-sequence of {47} 
formulae, each one being written down in virtue of some formal rule of inference 
having been applied to some previous formula or formulae (except, of course, for the 
initial formulae, which are given because they represent initial assumptions built into 
the system). The conclusions it is possible for the machine to produce as being true 
will therefore correspond to the theorems that can be proved in the corresponding 
formal system. We now construct a Gödelian formula in this formal system. This 
formula cannot be proved-in-the- system. Therefore the machine cannot produce the 
corresponding formula as being true. But we can see that the Gödelian formula is true: 
any rational being could follow Gödel's argument, and convince himself that the 
Gödelian formula, although unprovable-in-the-system, was nonetheless----in fact, for 
that very reason---true. Now any mechanical model of the mind must include a 
mechanism which can enunciate truths of arithmetic, because this is something which 
minds can do: in fact, it is easy to produce mechanical models which will in many 
respects produce truths of arithmetic far [259] better than human beings can. But in 
this one respect they cannot do so well: in that for every machine there is a truth 
which it cannot produce as being true, but which a mind can. This shows that a 
machine cannot be a complete and adequate model of the mind. It cannot do 
everything that a mind can do, since however much it can do, there is always 
something which it cannot do, and a mind can. This is not to say that we cannot build 
a machine to simulate any desired piece of mind-like behaviour: it is only that we 
cannot build a machine to simulate every piece of mind-like behaviour. We can (or 
shall be able to one day) build machines capable of reproducing bits of mind-like 
behaviour, and indeed of outdoing the performances of human minds: but however 
good the machine is, and however much better (116) it can do in nearly all respects 
than a human mind can, it always has this one weakness, this one thing which it 
cannot do, whereas a mind can. The Gödelian formula is the Achilles' heel of the 
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cybernetical machine. And therefore we cannot hope ever to produce a machine that 
will be able to do all that a mind can do: we can never not even in principle, have a 
mechanical model of the mind. 
This conclusion will be highly suspect to some people. They will object first that we 
cannot have it both that a machine can simulate any piece of mind-like behaviour, and 
that it cannot simulate every piece. To some it is a contradiction: to them it is enough 
to point out that there is no contradiction between the fact that for any natural number 
there can be produced a greater number, and the fact that a number cannot {48} be 
produced greater than every number. We can use the same analogy also against those 
who, finding a formula their first machine cannot produce as being true, concede that 
that machine is indeed inadequate, but thereupon seek to construct a second, more 
adequate, machine, in which the formula can be produced as being true. This they can 
indeed do: but then the second machine will have a Gödelian formula all of its own, 
constructed by applying Gödel's procedure to the formal system which represents its 
(the second machine's) own, enlarged, scheme of operations. And this formula the 
second machine will not be able to produce as being true, while a mind will be able to 
see that it is true. And if now a third machine is constructed, able to do what the 
second machine was unable to do, exactly the same will happen: there will be yet a 
third formula, the Gödelian formula for the formal system corresponding to the third 
machine's scheme of operations, which the third machine is unable to produce as 
being true, while a mind will still be able to see that it is true. And so it will go on. 
However complicated a machine we construct, it will, if it is a machine, correspond to 
a formal system, which in turn will be liable to the Gödel procedure [260] for finding 
a formula unprovable-in-that- system. This formula the machine will be unable to 
produce as being true, although a mind can see that it is true. And so the machine will 
still not be an adequate model of the mind. We are trying to produce a model of the 
mind which is mechanical---which is essentially "dead"---but the mind, being in fact 
"alive", can always go one better than any formal, ossified, dead, system can. Thanks 
to Gödel's theorem, the mind always has the last word. 
A second objection will now be made. The procedure whereby the Gödelian formula 
is constructed is a standard procedure---only so could we be sure that a Gödelian 
formula can be constructed for every formal system. But if it is a standard procedure, 
then a machine should be able to be programmed to carry it out too. We could 
construct a machine with the usual operations, and in addition an (117) operation of 
going through the Gödel procedure, and then producing the conclusion of that 
procedure as being true; and then repeating the procedure, and so on, as often as 
required. This would correspond to having a system with an additional rule of 
inference which allowed one to add, as a theorem, the Gödelian formula of the rest of 
the formal system, and then the Gödelian formula of this new, strengthened formal 
system, and so on. It would be tantamount to adding. to the original formal system an 
infinite sequence of axioms, each the Gödelian formula of the system hitherto 
obtained. Yet even so, the matter is not settled: for the machine with a Gödelizing 
{49} operator, as we might call it, is a different machine from the machines without 
such an operator; and, although the machine with the operator would be able to do 
those things in which the machines without the operator were outclassed by a mind, 
yet we might expect a mind, faced with a machine that possessed a Gödelizing 
operator, to take this into account, and out-Gödel the new machine, Gödelizing 
operator and all. This has, in fact, proved to be the case. Even if we adjoin to a formal 
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system the infinite set of axioms consisting of the successive Gödelian formulae, the 
resulting system is still incomplete, and contains a formula which cannot be proved-
in-the-system, although a rational being can, standing outside the system, see that it is 
true.2 We had expected this, for even if an infinite set of axioms were added, they 
would have to be specified by some finite rule or specification, and this further rule or 
specification could then be taken into account by a mind considering the enlarged 
formal system. In a sense, just because the mind has the last word, it can always pick 
a hole in any formal system presented to it as a model of its own workings. The [261] 
mechanical model must be, in some sense, finite and definite: and then the mind can 
always go one better. 
This is the answer to one objection put forward by Turing.3 He argues that the 
limitation to the powers of a machine do not amount to anything much. Although each 
individual machine is incapable of getting the right answer to some questions, after all 
each individual human being is fallible also: and in any case "our superiority can only 
be felt on such an occasion in relation to the one machine over which we have scored 
our petty triumph. There would be no question of triumphing simultaneously over all 
machines." But this is not the point. We are not discussing whether machines or 
minds are superior, but whether they are the same. In some respect machines are 
undoubtedly superior to human minds; and the question on which they are stumped is 
admittedly, a rather niggling, even (118) trivial, question. But it is enough, enough to 
show that the machine is not the same as a mind. True, the machine can do many 
things that a human mind cannot do: but if there is of necessity something that the 
machine cannot do, though the mind can, then, however trivial the matter is, we 
cannot equate the two, and cannot hope ever to have a mechanical model that will 
adequately represent the mind. Nor does it signify that it is only an individual 
machine we have triumphed over: for the triumph is not over only an individual 
machine, but over any individual that anybody cares to specify---in Latin {50} quivis 
or quilibet, not quidam---and a mechanical model of a mind must be an individual 
machine. Although it is true that any particular "triumph" of a mind over a machine 
could be "trumped" by another machine able to produce the answer the first machine 
could not produce, so that "there is no question of triumphing simultaneously over all 
machines", yet this is irrelevant. What is at issue is not the unequal contest between 
one mind and all machines, but whether there could be any, single, machine that could 
do all a mind can do. For the mechanist thesis to hold water, it must be possible, in 
principle, to produce a model, a single model, which can do everything the mind can 
do. It is like a game.4 The mechanist has first turn. He produces a---any, but only a 
definite one---mechanical model of the mind. I point to something that it cannot do, 
but the mind can. The mechanist is free to modify his example, but each time he does 
so, I am entitled to look for defects in the revised model. If the mechanist can devise a 
model that I cannot find fault with, his [262] thesis is established: if he cannot, then it 
is not proven: and since---as it turns out-he necessarily cannot, it is refuted. To 
succeed, he must be able to produce some definite mechanical model of the mind---
anyone he likes, but one he can specify, and will stick to. But since he cannot, in 
principle cannot, produce any mechanical model that is adequate, even though the 
point of failure is a minor one, he is bound to fail, and mechanism must be false. 
Deeper objections can still be made. Gödel's theorem applies to deductive systems, 
and human beings are not confined to making only deductive inferences. Gödel's 
theorem applies only to consistent systems, and one may have doubts about how far it 
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is permissible to assume that human beings are consistent. Gödel's theorem applies 
only to formal systems, and there is no a priori bound to human ingenuity which rules 
out the possibility of our contriving some replica of humanity which was not 
representable by a formal system. 
Human beings are not confined to making deductive inferences, and it has been urged 
by C.G. Hempel5 and Hartley Rogers6 that a fair model of the mind would have to 
allow for the possibility of making non-deductive inferences, and these might provide 
a way of escaping the Gödel result. Hartley Rogers makes the specific suggestion that 
the {51} machine should be programmed to entertain various propositions which had 
not been proved or disproved, and on occasion to add them to its list of axioms. 
Fermat's last theorem or Goldbach's conjecture might thus be added. If subsequently 
their inclusion was found to lead to a contradiction, they would be dropped again, and 
indeed in those circumstances their negations would be added to the list of theorems. 
In this sort of way a machine might well be constructed which was able to produce as 
true certain formulae which could not be proved from its axioms according to its rules 
of inference. And therefore the method of demonstrating the mind's superiority over 
the machine might no longer work. 
The construction of such a machine, however, presents difficulties. It cannot accept 
all unprovable formulae, and add them to its axioms, or it will find itself accepting 
both the Gödelian formula and its negation, and so be inconsistent. Nor would it do if 
it accepted the first of each pair of undecidable formulae, and, having added that to its 
axioms, would no longer regard its negation as undecidable, and so would never 
accept it too: for it might happen on the wrong member of the pair: it might accept the 
negation of the Gödelian formula rather than the Gödelian formula itself. And the 
system constituted [263] by a normal set of axioms with the negation of the Gödelian 
formula adjoined, although not inconsistent, is an unsound system, not admitting of 
the natural interpretation. It is something like non- Desarguian geometries in two 
dimensions: not actually inconsistent, but rather wrong, sufficiently much so to 
disqualify it from serious consideration. A machine which was liable to infelicities of 
that kind would be no model for the human mind. 
It becomes clear that rather careful criteria of selection of unprovable formulae will be 
needed. Hartley Rogers suggests some possible ones. But once we have rules 
generating new axioms, even if the axioms generated are only provisionally accepted, 
and are liable to be dropped again if they are found to lead to inconsistency, then we 
can set about doing a Gödel on this system, as on any other. We are in the same case 
as when we had a rule generating the infinite set of Gödelian formulae as axioms. In 
short, however a machine is designed, it must proceed either at random or according 
to definite rules. In so far as its procedure is random, we cannot outsmart it: (120) but 
its performance is not going to be a convincing parody of intelligent behaviour: in so 
far as its procedure is in accordance with definite rules, the Gödel method can {52} be 
used to produce a formula which the machine, according to those rules, cannot assert 
as true, although we, standing outside the system, can see it to be true.7 
Gödel's theorem applies only to consistent systems. All that we can prove formally is 
that if the system is consistent, then the Gödelian formula is unprovable-in-the-
system. To be able to say categorically that the Gödelian formula is unprovable-in- 
the-system, and therefore true, we must not only be dealing with a consistent system, 
 45 
but be able to say that it is consistent. And, as Gödel showed in his second theorem---
a corollary of his first---it is impossible to prove in a consistent system that that 
system is consistent. Thus in order to fault the machine by producing a formula of 
which we can say both that it is true and that the machine cannot produce it as true, 
we have to be able to say that the machine (or, rather, its corresponding formal 
system) is consistent; and there is no absolute proof of this. All we can do is to 
examine the machine and see if it appears consistent. There always remains the 
possibility of some inconsistency not yet detected. At best we can say that the 
machine is consistent, provided we are. But by what right can we do this? Gödel's 
second [264] theorem seems to show that a man cannot assert his own consistency, 
and so Hartley Rogers8 argues that we cannot really use Gödel's first theorem to 
counter the mechanist thesis unless we can say that "there are distinctive attributes 
which enable a human being to transcend this last limitation and assert his own 
consistency while still remaining consistent". 
A man's untutored reaction if his consistency is questioned is to affirm it vehemently: 
but this, in view of Gödel's second theorem, is taken by some philosophers as 
evidence of his actual inconsistency. Professor Putnam9 has suggested that human 
beings are machines, but inconsistent machines. If a machine were wired to 
correspond to an inconsistent system, then there would be no well-formed formula 
which it could not produce as true; and so in no way could it be proved to be inferior 
to a human being. Nor could we make its inconsistency a reproach to it---are not men 
inconsistent too? Certainly women are, and politicians; and {53} even male non-
politicians (121) contradict themselves sometimes, and a single inconsistency is 
enough to make a system inconsistent. 
The fact that we are all sometimes inconsistent cannot be gainsaid, but from this it 
does not follow that we are tantamount to inconsistent systems. Our inconsistencies 
are mistakes rather than set policies. They correspond to the occasional 
malfunctioning of a machine, not its normal scheme of operations. Witness to this that 
we eschew inconsistencies when we recognize them for what they are. If we really 
were inconsistent machines, we should remain content with our inconsistencies, and 
would happily affirm both halves of a contradiction. Moreover, we would be prepared 
to say absolutely anything---which we are not. It is easily shown10 that in an 
inconsistent formal system everything is provable, and the requirement of consistency 
turns out to be just that not everything can be proved in it---it is not the case that 
"anything goes." This surely is a characteristic of the mental operations of human 
beings: they are selective: they do discriminate between favoured---true---and 
unfavoured--- false---statements: when a person is prepared to say anything, and is 
prepared to contradict himself without any qualm or repugnance, then he is adjudged 
to have "lost his mind". Human beings, although not perfectly consistent, are not so 
much inconsistent as fallible. 
A fallible but self-correcting machine would still be subject to Gödel's results. Only a 
fundamentally inconsistent machine would [265] escape. Could we have a 
fundamentally inconsistent, but at the same time self- correcting machine, which both 
would be free of Gödel's results and yet would not be trivial and entirely unlike a 
human being? A machine with a rather recherché: inconsistency wired into it, so that 
for all normal purposes it was consistent, but when presented with the Gödelian 
sentence was able to prove it? 
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There are all sorts of ways in which undesirable proofs might be obviated. We might 
have a rule that whenever we have proved p and not-p, we examine their proofs and 
reject the longer. Or we might arrange the axioms and rules of inference in a certain 
order, and when a proof leading to an inconsistency is proffered, see what axioms and 
rules are required for it, and reject that axiom or rule which comes last in the ordering. 
In some such way as this we could have an inconsistent system, with a stop-rule, so 
that the inconsistency was never allowed to come out in the form of an inconsistent 
formula. 
The suggestion at first sight seems attractive: yet there is something deeply wrong. 
Even though we might preserve the facade of consistency {54} by having a rule that 
whenever two inconsistent formulae (122) appear we were to reject the one with the 
longer proof, yet such a rule would be repugnant in our logical sense. Even the less 
arbitrary suggestions are too arbitrary. No longer does the system operate with certain 
definite rules of inference on certain definite formulae. Instead, the rules apply, the 
axioms are true, provided . . . we do not happen to find it inconvenient. We no longer 
know where we stand. One application of the rule of Modus Ponens may be accepted 
while another is rejected: on one occasion an axiom may be true, or another 
apparently false. The system will have ceased to be a formal logical system, and the 
machine will barely qualify for the title of a model for the mind. For it will be far 
from resembling the mind in its operations: the mind does indeed try out dubious 
axioms and rules of inference; but if they are found to lead to contradiction, they are 
rejected altogether. We try out axioms and rules of inference provisionally---true: but 
we do not keep them, once they are found to lead to contradictions. We may seek to 
replace them with others, we may feel that our formalization is at fault, and that 
though some axiom or rule of inference of this sort is required, we have not been able 
to formulate it quite correctly: but we do not retain the, faulty formulations without 
modification, merely with the proviso that when the argument leads to a contradiction 
we refuse to follow it. To do this would be utterly irrational. We should be in the 
position that on some occasions when supplied with the premisses of a Modus 
Ponens, say, we applied the rule and allowed the conclusion, and [266] on other 
occasions we refused to apply the rule, and disallowed the conclusion. A person, or a 
machine, which did this without being able to give a good reason for so doing, would 
be accounted arbitrary and irrational. It is part of the concept of "arguments" or 
"reasons" that they are in some sense general and universal: that if Modus Ponens is a 
valid method of arguing when I am establishing a desired conclusion, it is a valid 
method also when you, my opponent, are establishing a conclusion I do not want to 
accept. We cannot pick and choose the times when a form of argument is to be valid; 
not if we are to be reasonable. It is of course true, that with our informal arguments, 
which are not fully formalized, we do distinguish between arguments which are at 
first sight similar, adding further reasons why they are nonetheless not really similar: 
and it might be maintained that a {55} machine might likewise be entitled to 
distinguish between arguments at first sight similar, if it had good reason for doing so. 
And it might further be maintained that the machine had good reason for rejecting 
those patterns of argument it did reject, indeed the best of reasons, namely the 
avoidance of contradiction. But that, if it is a reason at all, is too good a reason. We 
do not lay it to a man's credit that he avoids contradiction merely by refusing to accept 
those arguments which would lead him to it, for no other (123) reason than that 
otherwise he would be led to it. Special pleading rather than sound argument is the 
name for that type of reasoning. No credit accrues to a man who, clever enough to see 
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a few moves of argument ahead, avoids being brought to acknowledge his own 
inconsistency, by stonewalling as soon as he sees where the argument will end. 
Rather, we account him inconsistent too, not, in his case, because he affirmed and 
denied the same proposition, but because he used and refused to use the same rule of 
inference. A stop-rule on actually enunciating an inconsistency is not enough to save 
an inconsistent machine from being called inconsistent. 
The possibility yet remains that we are inconsistent, and there is no stop-rule, but the 
inconsistency is so recherché: that it has never turned up. After all, naive set-theory, 
which was deeply embedded in common- sense ways of thinking did turn out to be 
inconsistent. Can we be sure that a similar fate is not in store for simple arithmetic 
too? In a sense we cannot, in spite of our great feeling of certitude that our system of 
whole numbers which can be added and multiplied together is never going to prove 
inconsistent. It is just conceivable we might find we had formalized it incorrectly. If 
we had, we should try and formulate anew our intuitive concept of number, as we 
have our intuitive concept of a set. If we did this, we should of course recast our 
system: our present axioms and rules of inference would [267] be utterly rejected: 
there would be no question of our using and not using them in an "inconsistent" 
fashion. We should, once we had recast the system, be in the same position as we are 
now, possessed of a system believed to be consistent, but not provably so. But then 
could there not be some other inconsistency? It is indeed a possibility. But again no 
inconsistency once detected will be tolerated. We are determined not to be 
inconsistent, and are resolved to root out inconsistency, should any appear. Thus, 
although we can never be completely certain or completely free of the risk of having 
to think out our mathematics again, the ultimate position must be one of two: either 
we have a system of simple arithmetic which to the best of our knowledge and belief 
is consistent: or there is no such system possible. In the former case we are in the 
same position as at present: in the {56} latter, if we find that no system containing 
simple arithmetic can be free of contradictions, we shall have to abandon not merely 
the whole of mathematics and the mathematical sciences, but the whole of thought. 
It may still be maintained that although a man must in this sense assume, he cannot 
properly affirm, his own consistency without thereby belying his words. We may be 
consistent; indeed we have every reason to hope that we are: but a necessary modesty 
forbids us from saying so. Yet this is not quite what Gödel's second theorem states. 
Gödel has shown that in a consistent system a formula (124) stating the consistency of 
the system cannot be proved in that system. It follows that a machine, if consistent, 
cannot produce as true an assertion of its own consistency: hence also that a mind, if it 
were really a machine, could not reach the conclusion that it was a consistent one. For 
a mind which is not a machine no such conclusion follows. All that Gödel has proved 
is that a mind cannot produce a formal proof of the consistency of a formal system 
inside the system itself: but there is no objection to going outside the system and no 
objection to producing informal arguments for the consistency either of a formal 
system or of something less formal and less systematized. Such informal arguments 
will not be able to be completely formalized: but then the whole tenor of Gödel's 
results is that we ought not to ask, and cannot obtain, complete formalization. And 
although it would have been nice if we could have obtained them, since completely 
formalized arguments are more coercive than informal ones, yet since we cannot have 
all our arguments cast into that form, we must not hold it against informal arguments 
that they are informal or regard them all as utterly worthless. It therefore seems to me 
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both proper and reasonable for a mind to assert its own consistency: proper, because 
although machines, as we might have expected, are [268] unable to reflect fully on 
their own performance and powers, yet to be able to be self-conscious in this way is 
just what we expect of minds: and reasonable, for the reasons given. Not only can we 
fairly say simply that we know we are consistent, apart from our mistakes, but we 
must in any case assume that we are, if thought is to be possible at all; moreover we 
are selective, we will not, as inconsistent machines would, say anything and 
everything whatsoever: and finally we can, in a sense, decide to be consistent, in the 
sense that we can resolve not to tolerate inconsistencies in our thinking and speaking, 
and to eliminate them, if ever they should appear, by withdrawing and cancelling one 
limb of the contradiction. 
We can see how we might almost have expected Gödel's theorem to distinguish self-
conscious beings from inanimate objects. The essence of {57} the Gödelian formula 
is that it is self-referring. It says that "This formula is unprovable-in-this-system". 
When carried over to a machine, the formula is specified in terms which depend on 
the particular machine in question. The machine is being asked a question about its 
own processes. We are asking it to be self-conscious, and say what things it can and 
cannot do. Such questions notoriously lead to paradox. At one's first and simplest 
attempts to philosophize, one becomes entangled in questions of whether when one 
knows something one knows that one knows it, and what, when one is thinking of 
oneself, is being thought about, and what is doing the thinking. After one has been 
puzzled and bruised by this (125) problem for a long time, one learns not to press 
these questions: the concept of a conscious being is, implicitly, realized to be different 
from that of an unconscious object. In saying that a conscious being knows 
something, we are saying not only that he knows it, but that he knows that he knows 
it, and that he knows that he knows that he knows it, and so on, as long as we care to 
pose the question: there is, we recognize, an infinity here, but it is not an infinite 
regress in the bad sense, for it is the questions that peter out, as being pointless, rather 
than the answers. The questions are felt to be pointless because the concept contains 
within itself the idea of being able to go on answering such questions indefinitely. 
Although conscious beings have the power of going on, we do not wish to exhibit this 
simply as a succession of tasks they are able to perform, nor do we see the mind as an 
infinite sequence of selves and super-selves and super-superselves. Rather, we insist 
that a conscious being is a unity, and though we talk about parts of the mind, we do so 
only as a metaphor, and will not allow it to be taken literally. 
The paradoxes of consciousness arise because a conscious being can be aware of 
itself, as well as of other things, and yet cannot [269] really be construed as being 
divisible into parts. It means that a conscious being can deal with Gödelian questions 
in a way in which a machine cannot, because a conscious being can both consider 
itself and its performance and yet not be other than that which did the performance. A 
machine can be made in a manner of speaking to "consider" its own performance, but 
it cannot take this "into account" without thereby becoming a different machine, 
namely the old machine with a "new part" added. But it is inherent in our idea of a 
conscious mind that it can reflect upon itself and criticize its own performances, and 
no extra part is required to do this: it is already complete, and has no Achilles' heel. 
The thesis thus begins to become more a matter of conceptual analysis {58}than 
mathematical discovery. This is borne out by considering another argument put 
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forward by Turing.11 So far, we have constructed only fairly simple and predictable 
artefacts. When we increase the complexity of our machines there may, perhaps, be 
surprises in store for us. He draws a parallel with a fission pile. Below a certain 
"critical" size, nothing much happens: but above the critical size, the sparks begin to 
fly. So too, perhaps, with brains and machines. Most brains and all machines are, at 
present, "subcritical"---they react to incoming stimuli in a stodgy and uninteresting 
way, have no ideas of their own, can produce only stock responses ---but a few brains 
at present, and possibly some machines in the future, are super-critical, and scintillate 
on their own account. (126) Turing is suggesting that it is only a matter of complexity, 
and that above a certain level of complexity a qualitative difference appears, so that 
44 super-critical" machines will be quite unlike the simple ones hitherto envisaged. 
This may be so. Complexity often does introduce qualitative differences. Although it 
sounds implausible, it might turn out that above a certain level of complexity, a 
machine ceased to be predictable, even in principle, and started doing things on its 
own account, or, to use a very revealing phrase, it might begin to have a mind of its 
own. It might begin to have a mind of its own. It would begin to have a mind of its 
own when it was no longer entirely predictable and entirely docile, but was capable of 
doing things which we recognized as intelligent, and not just mistakes or random 
shots, but which we had not programmed into it. But then it would cease to be a 
machine, within the meaning of the act. What is at stake in the mechanist debate is not 
how minds are, or might be, brought into being, but how they operate. It is essential 
for the mechanist thesis that the mechanical model of the mind shall operate 
according [270] to "mechanical principles", that is, that we can understand the 
operation of the whole in terms of the operations of its parts, and the operation of each 
part either shall be determined by its initial state and the construction of the machine, 
or shall be a random choice between a determinate number of determinate operations. 
If the mechanist produces a machine which is so complicated that this ceases to hold 
good of it, then it is no longer a machine for the purposes of our discussion, no matter 
how it was constructed. We should say, rather, that he had created a mind, in the same 
sort of sense as we procreate people at present. There would then be two ways of 
bringing new minds into the world, the traditional way, by begetting children born of 
women, and a new way by constructing very, very complicated systems of, say, 
valves {59} and relays. When talking of the second way, we should take care to stress 
that although what was created looked like a machine, it was not one really, because it 
was not just the total of its parts. One could not tell what it was going to do merely by 
knowing the way in which it was built up and the initial state of its parts: one could 
not even tell the limits of what it could do, for even when presented with a Gödel-type 
question, it got the answer right. In fact we should say briefly that any system which 
was not floored by the Gödel question was eo ipso not a Turing machine, i.e., not a 
machine within the meaning of the act. 
If the proof of the falsity of mechanism is valid, it is of the greatest consequence for 
the whole of philosophy. Since the time of Newton, the bogey of mechanist 
determinism has obsessed philosophers. If we were to be scientific, it seemed that we 
must look on human beings as (127) determined automata, and not as autonomous 
moral agents; if we were to be moral, it seemed that we must deny science its due, set 
an arbitrary limit to its progress in understanding human neurophysiology, and take 
refuge in obscurantist mysticism. Not even Kant could resolve the tension between 
the two standpoints. But now, though many arguments against human freedom still 
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remain, the argument from mechanism, perhaps the most compelling argument of 
them all, has lost its power. No longer on this count will it be incumbent on the 
natural philosopher to deny freedom in the name of science: no longer will the 
moralist feel the urge to abolish knowledge to make room for faith. We can even 
begin to see how there could be room for morality, without its being necessary to 
abolish or even to circumscribe the province of science. Our argument has set no 
limits to scientific enquiry: it will still be possible to investigate the working of the 
brain. It will still be possible to produce mechanical models of the mind. Only, now 
we can see that no mechanical model will be completely adequate, nor any 
explanations [271] in purely mechanist terms. We can produce models and 
explanations, and they will be illuminating: but, however far they go, there will 
always remain more to be said. There is no arbitrary bound to scientific enquiry: but 
no scientific enquiry can ever exhaust the infinite variety of the human mind.12 
 
1. See A. M. Turing, "Computing Machinery and Intelligence," Mind, 1950, pp. 433-
60, reprinted in The World of Mathematics, edited by James R. Newmann, pp. 2099-
2123; and K. R. Popper, "Indeterminism in Quantum Physics and Classical Physics," 
British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 1 (1951), 179-88. The question is touched 
upon by Paul Rosenbloom; Elements of Mathematical Logic, pp. 207-8; Ernest Nagel 
and James R. Newmann, Gödel's Proof, pp. 100-2; and by Hartley Rogers, Theory of 
Recursive Functions and Effective Computability (mimeographed), 1957, Vol. 1, pp. 
152 ff. 
 
2. Gödel's original proof applies; v. _ I init. and _ 6 init. of his Lectures at the Institute 
of Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J., U.S.A., 1934. 
 
3. Mind, 1950, pp. 444-5; Newman, p. 2110. 
 
4. For a similar type of argument, see J. R. Lucas: "The Lesbian Rule"; Philosophy, 
(July 1955) pp. 202-206; and "On Not Worshipping Facts"; The Philosophical 
Quarterly, April 1958, p. 144. 
 
5. In private conversation. 
 
6. Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Computability, 1957, Vol. 1, pp. 152 
ff. 
 
7. Gödel's original proof applies if the rule is such as to generate a primitive recursive 
class of additional formulae; v. _ I init. and _ 6 init. of his Lectures at the Institute of 
Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J., U.S.A., 1934. It is in fact sufficient that the class be 
recursively enumerable. See Barkley Rosser: "Extensions of some theorems of Gödel 
and Church," Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1, 1936, pp. 87-91. 
 
8. Op. cit., p. 154. 
 
9. University of Prineeton, N.J., U.S.A. in private conversation. 
 
10. See, e.g., Alonzo Church: Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Princeton, Vol.1, _ 
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11. Mind, 1950, p. 454; Newman, pp. 2117-18. 
 
12.Some objections by Benacerraf and Putman are considered in ``Satan Stultified'' 
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11.3 Lucas against Mechanism (*) 
 
David Lewis 
 
University of California at Los Angeles 
 
 
J. R. Lucas argues in Minds, Machines, and Gödel, (1) that his potential output of 
truths of arithmetic cannot be duplicated by any Turing machine, and a fortiori 
cannot be duplicated by any machine. Given any Turing machine that generates a 
sequence of truths of arithmetic, Lucas can produce as true some sentence of 
arithmetic that the machine will never generate. Therefore Lucas is no machine. 
 
I believe Lucas’s critics have missed something true and important in his 
argument. I shall restate the argument in order to show this. Then I shall try to 
show how we may avoid the anti-mechanist conclusion of restated argument. 
 
 As I read Lucas, he is rightly defending the soundness of a certain infinitary rule 
of inference. Let L be some adequate formalisation of the language of arithmetic; 
henceforth when I speak of sentences, I mean sentences of L, and when I call 
them true, I mean that they are true on the standard interpretation of L. We can 
define a certain effective function Con from machine tables to sentences, such 
that we can prove the following by metalinguistic reasoning about L. 
 
C1. Whenever M specifies a machine whose potential output is a set S of 
sentences, Con (M) is true if and only if S is consistent. 
C2. Whenever M specifies a machine whose potential output is a set S of true 
sentences, Con (M) is true. 
C3. Whenever M specifies a machine whose potential output is a set S of 
sentences including the Peano axioms, Con (M) is provable form S only if S is 
consistent. 
 
Indeed, there are many such functions; let Con be any chosen one of them. 
Call  a consistency sentence for S if and only if there is some machine table M 
such that  Con (M) and S is the potential output of the machine whose table is 
M. Now I can state the rule R which I take Lucas to be defending. 
R. If S is a set of sentences and  is a consistency sentence for S, infer  from  
     S. 
 
Lucas’s rule R is a perfectly sound rule of inference: if the premises S are all 
true, then by C2 so is the conclusion . To use R is to perform an inference in L, 
not to ascend to metalinguistic reasoning about L. (It takes metalinguistic 
reasoning to show that R is truth-preserving, but it takes metalinguistic reasoning 
to show that any rule is truth-preserving.) 
 
Lucas, like the rest of us, begins by accepting the Peano axioms for arithmetic. 
(Elementary or higher-order; it will make no difference.) A sentence is a 
theorem of Peano's arithmetic if and only if  belongs to every superset of the 
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axioms, which are closed under the ordinary rules of logical inference. Likewise, 
let us say that a sentence  is a theorem of Lucas arithmetic if and only if  
belongs to every superset of the axioms which are closed under the ordinary rules 
of logical inference and also closed under Lucas’s rule R. We have every bit as 
much reason to believe that the theorems of Lucas arithmetic are true as we have 
to believe that the theorems of Peano arithmetic are true: we believe the Peano 
axioms, and the theorems come from them by demonstrability truth-preserving 
rules of inference. Knowing this, Lucas stands ready to produce as true any 
theorem of Lucas arithmetic. (2)  
 
Suppose Lucas arithmetic were potential output of some Turing machine. Then it 
would have a consistency sentence . Since Lucas arithmetic is closed under R, 
 would be a theorem of Lucas arithmetic. Then  would, trivially, be provable 
from Lucas arithmetic. Then, by C3, Lucas arithmetic would be inconsistent. 
Lucas arithmetic would contain falsehoods, and so would the Peano axioms 
themselves. Therefore, insofar as we trust the Peano axioms, we know that Lucas 
arithmetic is not the potential output of any Turing machine. Assuming that any 
machine can be simulated by a Turing machine - an assumption that can best be 
taken as a partial explication of Lucas’s concept of a machine  - we know that 
neither is it the potential output of any machine. Thus if Lucas arithmetic is the 
potential output of Lucas, then Lucas is no machine. 
 
So far, so good; but there is one more step. Although Lucas has good reason to 
believe that all theorems of Lucas arithmetic are true, it does not yet follow that 
his potential output is the whole of Lucas arithmetic. He can produce as true any 
sentence, which ha can somehow verify to be a theorem of Lucas arithmetic. If 
there are theorems of Lucas arithmetic that Lucas cannot verify to be such, then, 
his potential output falls short of Lucas arithmetic. For all we know, it might be 
the potential output of a suitable machine. To complete his argument that he is no 
machine  - at least, as I have restated the argument  - Lucas must convince us that 
he has the necessary general ability to verify theoremhood in Lucas arithmetic. If 
he has that remarkable ability, the he can beat the steam drill - and no wonder. 
But we are given no reason to think that he does have it. 
 
It is no use appealing to the fact that we can always verify theoremhood in any 
ordinary axiomatic theory  - say, Peano's arithmetic  - by exhibiting a proof. True, 
if we waive practical limitations on endurance; but Lucas arithmetic is not like an 
ordinary axiomatic theory. Its theorems do have proofs; but some of these proofs 
are transfinite sequences of sentences since Lucas’s rule R can take an infinite set 
S of premises. These transfinite proofs will not be discovered by any finite 
search, and they cannot be exhibited and checked in any ordinary way. Even the 
finite proofs in Lucas arithmetic cannot be checked by any mechanical 
procedure, as proofs in an ordinary axiomatic theory can be. In order to check 
whether Lucas’s rule R has been used correctly, a checking procedure would 
have to decide whether a given finite set S of sentences was the output of a 
machine with a given table M. But a general method for deciding that could 
easily be converted into a general method for deciding whether any given Turing 
machine will halt on any given input  - and that, we know, is impossible. 
 
We do not know how Lucas verifies theoremhood in Lucas arithmetic, so we do 
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not know how many of its theorems ha can produce as true. He can certainly go 
beyond Peano arithmetic, and he is perfectly justified in claiming the right to do 
so. But he can go beyond Peano's arithmetic and still be a machine, provided that 
some sort of limitations on his ability to verify theoremhood eventually leave 
him unable to recognise some theorem of Lucas arithmetic, and hence 
unwarranted in producing it as true. (3)  
 
Notes 
 
(*) First published in Philosophy, 1969, 44, pp. 231-233. © Cambridge 
University Press. Republished by permission. back 
(1) Minds, Machines, and Godel, Philosophy, 36 (1961): 112-127. back 
(2) Lucas arithmetic belongs to a class of extensions of Peano arithmetic studied 
by A. M. Turing in “Systems of Logic based on Ordinals”, Proceedings of the 
London Mathematical Society, sec. 2, 45 (1939): 161-228, and by S. Feferman in 
“Transfinite Recursive Progressions of Axiomatic Theories”, Journal of Symbolic 
Logic, 27 (1962): 259-316. back 
(3) I am indebted to George Boolos and Wilfrid Hodges for valuable criticisms of 
an earlier version of this paper. back 
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11.4 Gödel’s Theorem and Mechanism (*) 
  
David Coder 
  
University of Alberta 
  
  
In Minds, machines, and Gödel, (1) J. R. Lucas claims that Gödel’s 
incompleteness theorem constitutes a proof “that Mechanism is false, that is, 
that minds cannot be explained as machines”. (2) He claims further that “if the 
proof of the falsity of mechanism is valid, it is of the greatest consequence for 
the whole of philosophy”. (3) It seems to me that both of these claims are 
exaggerated. It is true that no mind can be explained as a machine. But it is not 
true that Gödel’s theorem proves this. At most, Gödel’s theorem proves that not 
all minds can be explained as machines. Since this is so, Gödel’s theorem 
cannot be expected to throw much light on why minds are different from 
machines. Lucas overestimates the importance of Gödel’s theorem for the topic 
of mechanism, I believe, because he presumes falsely that being unable to 
follow any but mechanical procedures in mathematics makes something a 
machine. 
Lucas explains Gödel’s theorem in this way: 
 Gödel’s theorem states that in any consistent system which is strong enough to 
produce simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot be proved-in- the 
system, but which we can see to be true. (4) 
 I shall not base my objection to Lucas’s argument upon any exception one 
might take to this statement of Gödel’s theorem. 
Lucas’s argument is this: 
 Gödel’s theorem must apply to cybernetical machines, because it is of the 
essence of being a machine, that it should be a concrete instantiation of a formal 
system. It follows that given any machine which is consistent and capable of 
doing simple arithmetic, there is a formula which it is incapable of producing as 
being true - i.e., the formula is unprovable in-the-system - but which we can see 
to be true. It follows that no machine can be a complete or adequate model of 
the mind, that minds are essentially different from machines. (5) 
  
If minds are essentially different form machines, then no mind is machine-like. 
The antecedent and the consequent of this proposition are true. But Lucas’s 
argument fails to establish either. Consider a man whose intelligence is 
sufficient for him to learn to make deductions form the axioms of some system 
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of number theory, but insufficient for him to follow Gödel’s incompleteness 
proof. Try as we may, we cannot get him to see that Gödel’s formula is true. So 
far as Lucas has shown, there is nothing that this man can do that a machine 
cannot do. Hence Lucas has not shown that a machine cannot provide an 
adequate model for this man’s mind. He has not shown that minds are 
essentially different form machines. (“x is essentially different from y” is 
essentially different from “x is not essentially the same as y”.) 
We may, however, make use of the above counter-example to Lucas’s argument 
to argue in a different way for his conclusion. Let us distinguish two cases. One 
man is smart enough to exercise some ingenuity in the deduction of theorems in 
number theory. Given a simple theorem, he may see how to prove it. But he is 
not smart enough to follow Gödel’s proof. Another man is not capable of even 
this man’s limited ingenuity. However, he can recognise a proof of a theorem of 
number theory when he sees one. Given an enumeration of the sequence of 
well-formed formulas of the system, he can distinguish those sequences that 
constitute proofs of their last lines form those that do not. 
If the mind of either of these men is machine-like, it is the mind of the latter. He 
finds proofs for theorems in the same  way a machine does. The former 
exercises ingenuity. 
But the mind of the latter is not so machine-like, either. He has to check over 
many sequences several times before he is sure whether they are proofs; one 
day he recognises straightway that a certain sequence is a proof, but on a 
subsequent trial has to check it several times before he is sure; he checks the 
sequences in a whimsical order; and so on. A machine might simulate such 
behaviour. It might e.g. scan the lines of each sequence twice before printing 
“proof” or “non-proof”. But the machine will behave this way because we built 
it to behave this way. If the repetitions serve any purpose at all, it will be to 
accomplish something that could not, given the machine’s construction, be 
accomplished in one scanning. It will not be to “make sure” of anything the 
machine has already done. 
Lucas’s argument gives the false impression that if no one could do arithmetical 
operations except by picking out the proofs in an enumeration from the non-
proofs, a complete mechanical model of our actual behaviour when we do 
arithmetical operations could be constructed. We see here the common 
misconception that formal systems provide something approaching blueprints 
for machines. As Lucas says, “… it is of the essence of being a machine, that it 
should be a concrete instantiation of a formal system”. (6) What makes 
something a machine, then, is most of all that it operates an algorithm. The way 
in which it operates the algorithm is, then, unimportant. Or, more accurately, 
there is but one way to operate an algorithm: mechanically. An algorithm is, 
after all, a mechanical procedure. 
There is a misunderstanding here of how the term “mechanical” is used in 
mathematics. Perhaps we can see from my discussion of Turing machines how 
this misunderstanding arises. Mathematical definitions of “Turing machine” (7) 
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are usually preceded by heuristic remarks which make it look as if the 
definitions were intended to specify the behaviour of an actual machine. But 
this appearance is deceptive. A Turing machine is first of all an algorithm. We 
may also call “Turing machine” anything that calculates according to a Turing 
algorithm. Let us teach the man who separates sequences of well-formed 
formulas of number theory into proofs and non-proofs to calculate according to 
Turing algorithms. Given any Turing algorithm, he can follow its instructions 
through. This is a completely mechanical procedure. But “mechanical” ids here 
a mathematical concept. It means only: the instructions given by a Turing 
algorithm do not at any step leave open the next step in the calculation. But not 
everything a man does when he is operating an algorithm is a step in the 
calculation. So we should not infer that the man whose mathematical abilities 
are limited to operating Turing algorithms is, regarding his “mathematical 
faculty”, a machine. He does not follow this mechanical procedure 
mechanically, as if driven by clockwork. Where, according to his instructions, 
he is supposed to erase one symbol and print another, he may erase the former, 
print the same one again, notice his slip, and finally print the right symbol. Or 
he may begin work on the wrong square of his tape and have to back up. He 
may get confused and have to start again. Perhaps he deliberately writes the 
wrong symbol in every square, but remembers the right one, and when he is 
trough makes necessary corrections. 
There is nothing in the mathematical definition of “Turing machine” which 
keeps this man from being a Turing machine in the sense of what calculates 
according to a Turing algorithm. But if you mistake this definition for the 
specification of an actual machine’s behaviour, you might think otherwise. You 
might think that what does not behave in a completely mechanical fashion does 
not calculate according to a completely mechanical procedure which a Turing 
machine does. 
It seems to me that Lucas misunderstands “mechanical” in this way. He thinks 
of being unable to calculate except according to mechanical procedures as a 
sufficient condition for being a machine. But either this leaves out of account 
the fact that one important part of something’s being a machine is that its 
construction determines its operation; or the mathematical definition of “Turing 
machine” requires that the behaviour of whatever operates a Turing algorithm is 
determined by its construction. The latter alternative is false, or so I have 
argued. Lucas presumes its truth. This comes out in a passage in which he 
argues that if we are to consider what the actual behaviour of a machine can be 
instead of what it must be, we must imagine that it calculates according to a 
semi-mechanical instead of a fully mechanical procedure. 
  
Our idea of a machine is just this, that its behaviour is completely determined 
by the way it is made and the incoming “stimuli”: there is no possibility of its 
acting on its own: given a certain form of construction and a certain input of 
information, the nit must act in a certain specific way. We, however, shall be 
concerned not with what a machine must do, but with what it can do. That is, 
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instead of considering the whole set of rules which together determine exactly 
what a machine will do in given circumstances, we shall consider only an 
outline of those rules, which will delimit the possible responses of the machine, 
but completely. The complete rules will determine the operations completely at 
every stage; at every stage there will be a definite instruction, e.g. “if the 
number is prime and greater than two add one and divide by two: if it is not 
prime, divide by its smallest factor”: we, however, will consider the possibility 
of there being alternative instructions, e.g. “In a fraction you may divide top 
and bottom by any number which is a factor of both numerator and 
denominator”. In relaxing the specification of our model,…it is no longer 
completely determinist, though still entirely mechanistic,… (8) 
 So the behaviour of a calculator is completely determined by its construction 
and “input” unless the instructions by which it calculates are not definite, i.e. 
unless it calculates by a non-mechanical procedure. It is not surprising, then, 
that Lucas thinks it important, for the refutation of mechanism, that “we” are 
not restricted, in doing arithmetic, to calculating according to mechanical 
procedures. But this fact loses all importance once we see that even if we could 
do arithmetic in no other way, it would not follow that our behaviour, in doing 
arithmetic, was determined by our “construction” and “input”. 
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11.5 Lucas against Mechanism: A rejoinder 
from Philosophy, pp.149-151. 
J. R. LUCAS 
PROFESSOR LEWIS 1 and Professor Coder 2 criticize my use of Gödel's theorem to 
refute Mechanism. 3 Their criticisms are valuable. In order to meet them I need to 
show more clearly both what the tactic of my argument is at one crucial point and the 
general aim of the whole manoeuvre. 
Lewis argues that I have established that there is a certain Lucas arithmetic which is 
clearly true and cannot be the output of some Turing machine. If I could produce the 
whole of Lucas arithmetic, then I would certainly not be a Turing machine. But there 
is no reason to suppose that I am able in general to verify theoremhood iii Lueas 
arithmetic. Coder's first complaint touches on a similar point. Some men cannot 
follow Gödel's theorem, and my argument cannot show that their minds are not 
machines, and therefore has not shown that minds are essentially different from 
machines. 
In order to refute Mechanism, however, I do not need to show that any mind can do 
all of Lucas arithmetic or that all minds can understand Gödel's theorem. Mechanism 
makes a universal claim. A single counter-instance is fatal. Once its defences are 
breached, we may follow up, and take over further positions we have not fought for. 
And this I do. But my first concern is the limited one of securing a single counter-
instance. For that I do not need the whole of Lucas arithmetic: a single theorem will 
do, provided that I can see it to be true and the machine cannot. The machine: which 
machine? the argument at this stage becomes 'dialectical', dynamic, and finicky. 4 If I 
lay claim to less than the whole of Lucas arithmetic, I might still be a machine. 
Indeed, anything which I, a finite being living for only a finite time, actually do, could 
be copied by some machine. Yet the possibility of a machine's being able to simulate 
actual behaviour does not seem very important: to be a person is not merely to have 
actually done some things but to be able to do others as yet unspecified. A machine, 
to be equivalent to a mind, must not merely do everything the mind has done, but 
have the potentiality of doing anything the mind could do. A machine fails to be 
equivalent to a mind if there is anything it cannot do and a mind can. And for each 
particular machine there is some theorem in Lucas arithmetic which it cannot produce 
as true. In order therefore to refute Mechanism, what I have to do is to show that a 
mind can produce not the whole of Lueas arithmetic, but only a small, relevant part. 
And this I think I can show, thanks to Gödel's theorem. Gödel's theorem shows us 
how, making the relevant modifications for each particular case, we can find a 
formula which we can prove to the machine (i.e. in the machine's system) to be 
unprovable by the machine (provided it is not an inconsistent machine that can 'prove' 
everything), but which we can see to be a theorem in Lucas arithmetic. The argument 
depends essentially on the order of play. I can neither prove the whole of Lueas 
arithmetic nor some part of it that is outside the output of any machine. But since the 
Mechanist claims that every mind can be represented as a machine, I produce a 
particular mind and challenge him to specify which machine represents this mind, and 
when he has specified a particular machine, I show that there is a particular formula 
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which that particular [149] machine cannot prove but which this particular mind can. 
The Mechanist's claim, as detailed by him, is refuted. Moreover, it is fairly easy for us 
rational beings to see that however the Mechanist varies the specification of his 
detailed claim the upshot must be the same. And therefore there is and must be a 
counter-instance to the claim, and Mechanism must be false. 
So much for the in-fighting. Lewis's reconstruction of my argument does, however, 
reveal the general line of advance. Lucas arithmetic (or something richer still), rather 
than Peano arithmetic, represents the sort of arithmetic that minds, in contrast to 
machines, can do. For minds can operate in accordance with Lewis's `infinitary rule 
of inference'. 
R: If S is a set of sentences and P is a consistency sentence for S, infer P from S. 
I am not myself happy with the term `infinitary rule of inference', as the whole point 
of conducting our inferences by rules is that the rule should be definite and finite. 
Many of our inferences, particularly many nonmathematical ones, cannot be 
formalised, and I believe this to be a fact of fundamental importance for philosophy. 
Even in mathematics not all can, and it is a distinguishing mark of a rational being 
that he can draw valid inferences even in the absence of a definite rule allowing him 
to. The pattern of inference expressed by Lewis's R is one such that a mind would 
accept, and his Lucas arithmetic typifies the difference between the sort of arithmetic 
that minds can do and the sort that machines can do, even though no mind can 
produce the whole of Lucas arithmetic or be able in general to verify theoremhood in 
Lucas arithmetic. This also reveals the 'essential' difference that worries Coder. He 
complains that I have shown only that a few smart mathematicians are not machines, 
and therefore have not established that minds in general are essentially unlike 
machines. But although the ability to understand Gödel's theorem is limited, the 
ability to think up new arguments is not. Many men could understand and accept 
Lewis's R even if they could not follow the proof of Gödel's theorem, and therefore 
their arithmetic would lie within the Lucas arithmetic (or something richer), but not 
within the narrow confines of Peano arithmetic. They, like the high-powered 
mathematicians, are not machines, because they share with them a power of reasoning 
which cannot be completely reduced to rule observance. This is what makes the 
essential difference between minds and machines. The peculiarity of minds that can 
follow Gödel's theorem is not that they are more mind-like than non-mathematical 
ones, but that their originality and power of reasoning without the rule-book is such 
that even the Mechanist must admit it. Mathematical ability is not more 
unmachinelike than other intellectual powers, but more easily compared with the 
powers of machines, and therefore more easily proved to be different. 
Coder also complains that my Gödelian argument is unnecessary, because minds are 
so obviously unlike machines that nobody could ever suppose them to be the same. 
Even the most moron-like mathematician behaves quite unlike a Turing machine, and 
it is only because, in Coder's view, I have misunderstood the term 'mechanical' that I 
think there is a problem which my argument can resolve. But Coder himself 
misunderstands my argument here, and imputes to me a sufficient condition where I 
only claim a necessary one. I do not think 'of being unable to calculate except 
according to mechanical procedures as a sufficient condition for being a machine', 
although I do argue that it is necessary condition, so [150] much so that if an apparent 
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machine, with wires and wheels and valves, could reason cogently but not 
mechanically, I should be prepared to say that it was not, despite its appearances, 
really a machine but had a mind of its own after all. The fact that men may calculate 
only according to an algorithm does not prove them to be machines: but if a man's 
reasoning cannot be reduced to a particular algorithm, then it does follow that he 
cannot be really that sort of machine which can infer only in accordance with that 
algorithm. 
Of course, there are other reasons too for thinking that men are not machines, and 
Coder, along with many others, is entitled to feel that my argument is not so much 
invalid as unnecessary. Perhaps it is. If we base ourselves on ordinary facts, it is quite 
clear that the activity of thinking is fluid, dynamic, tentative, spontaneous, sometimes 
creative, and not rule-bound, rigid, static, mechanical, formalised and ossified: but 
philosophers are very resistant to facts, particularly the so-called empiricists of the 
last generation, who, together with some cyberneticians of the present age, have been 
utterly convinced that in the last resort the workings of the human mind cats be 
understood in purely mechanical terms. Often some metaphysical doctrine of 
materialism underlies this conviction. But in any case it is itself a metaphysical tenet, 
and cannot be shaken by appeal to the facts, because the in the last resort clause 
always offers an escape from the facts as they seem to be at present. The Mechanist 
can concede that human behaviour does not look very machine-like at present, while 
maintaining that ultimately he will be able to explain it in mechanical terms. Against 
such a position facts are of no avail. However much we point out ways in which 
ratiocination is unlike anything we expect of a machine, it always could be, so far as 
these facts go, that it is only complexity that differentiates minds from machines, and 
that there is no essential difference of kind between them, but only one of degree. If a 
tough-minded philosopher is prepared to brush all other arguments aside, my 
Gödelian argument will act as a long-stop. It is a reductio ad absurdum. Perhaps it is 
an absurd thesis anyhow. But not every philosopher would agree, and many of the 
arguments demonstrating its absurdity appeal too much to common sense to be telling 
with those who boast their lack of it. The merit of the Gödelian argument is that the 
reductio is itself by means of inescapable logical arguments to a position which even 
a tough-minded philosopher must admit to be absurd. I am using a steam-hammer to 
crack a nut; but a nut so hard as to be almost impenetrable to reason. 
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11.6 COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE  By A. M. Turing 
Turing, A.M. (1950). Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59, 433-460. 
 1. The Imitation Game 
I propose to consider the question, "Can machines think?" This should begin with 
definitions of the meaning of the terms "machine" and "think." The definitions might 
be framed so as to reflect so far as possible the normal use of the words, but this 
attitude is dangerous, If the meaning of the words "machine" and "think" are to be 
found by examining how they are commonly used it is difficult to escape the 
conclusion that the meaning and the answer to the question, "Can machines think?" is 
to be sought in a statistical survey such as a Gallup poll. But this is absurd. Instead of 
attempting such a definition I shall replace the question by another, which is closely 
related to it and is expressed in relatively unambiguous words. 
The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call the 
'imitation game." It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an 
interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart front 
the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine which of the 
other two is the man and which is the woman. He knows them by labels X and Y, and 
at the end of the game he says either "X is A and Y is B" or "X is B and Y is A." The 
interrogator is allowed to put questions to A and B thus: 
C: Will X please tell me the length of his or her hair? 
Now suppose X is actually A, then A must answer. It is A's object in the game to try 
and cause C to make the wrong identification. His answer might therefore be: 
"My hair is shingled, and the longest strands are about nine inches long." 
In order that tones of voice may not help the interrogator the answers should be 
written, or better still, typewritten. The ideal arrangement is to have a teleprinter 
communicating between the two rooms. Alternatively the question and answers can 
be repeated by an intermediary. The object of the game for the third player (B) is to 
help the interrogator. The best strategy for her is probably to give truthful answers. 
She can add such things as "I am the woman, don't listen to him!" to her answers, but 
it will avail nothing as the man can make similar remarks.  
We now ask the question, "What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in 
this game?" Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played 
like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These 
questions replace our original, "Can machines think?"  
2. Critique of the New Problem 
As well as asking, "What is the answer to this new form of the question," one may 
ask, "Is this new question a worthy one to investigate?" This latter question we 
investigate without further ado, thereby cutting short an infinite regress. 
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The new problem has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line between the 
physical and the intellectual capacities of a man. No engineer or chemist claims to be 
able to produce a material which is indistinguishable from the human skin. It is 
possible that at some time this might be done, but even supposing this invention 
available we should feel there was little point in trying to make a "thinking machine" 
more human by dressing it up in such artificial flesh. The form in which we have set 
the problem reflects this fact in the condition which prevents the interrogator from 
seeing or touching the other competitors, or hearing -their voices. Some other 
advantages of the proposed criterion may be shown up by specimen questions and 
answers. Thus: 
Q: Please write me a sonnet on the subject of the Forth Bridge. 
A : Count me out on this one. I never could write poetry. 
Q: Add 34957 to 70764. 
A: (Pause about 30 seconds and then give as answer) 105621. 
Q: Do you play chess? 
A: Yes. 
Q: I have K at my K1, and no other pieces. You have only K at K6 and R at R1. It is 
your move. What do you play?  
A: (After a pause of 15 seconds) R-R8 mate. 
The question and answer method seems to be suitable for introducing almost any one 
of the fields of human endeavour that we wish to include. We do not wish to penalise 
the machine for its inability to shine in beauty competitions, nor to penalise a man for 
losing in a race against an aeroplane. The conditions of our game make these 
disabilities irrelevant. The "witnesses" can brag, if they consider it advisable, as much 
as they please about their charms, strength or heroism, but the interrogator cannot 
demand practical demonstrations. 
The game may perhaps be criticised on the ground that the odds are weighted too 
heavily against the machine. If the man were to try and pretend to be the machine he 
would clearly make a very poor showing. He would be given away at once by 
slowness and inaccuracy in arithmetic. May not machines carry out something which 
ought to be described as thinking but which is very different from what a man does? 
This objection is a very strong one, but at least we can say that if, nevertheless, a 
machine can be constructed to play the imitation game satisfactorily, we need not be 
troubled by this objection. 
It might be urged that when playing the "imitation game" the best strategy for the 
machine may possibly be something other than imitation of the behaviour of a man. 
This may be, but I think it is unlikely that there is any great effect of this kind. In any 
case there is no intention to investigate here the theory of the game, and it will be 
assumed that the best strategy is to try to provide answers that would naturally be 
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given by a man. 
3. The Machines Concerned in the Game 
The question which we put in 1 will not be quite definite until we have specified what 
we mean by the word "machine." It is natural that we should wish to permit every 
kind of engineering technique to be used in our machines. We also wish to allow the 
possibility than an engineer or team of engineers may construct a machine which 
works, but whose manner of operation cannot be satisfactorily described by its 
constructors because they have applied a method which is largely experimental. 
Finally, we wish to exclude from the machines men born in the usual manner. It is 
difficult to frame the definitions so as to satisfy these three conditions. One might for 
instance insist that the team of engineers should be all of one sex, but this would not 
really be satisfactory, for it is probably possible to rear a complete individual from a 
single cell of the skin (say) of a man. To do so would be a feat of biological technique 
deserving of the very highest praise, but we would not be inclined to regard it as a 
case of "constructing a thinking machine." This prompts us to abandon the 
requirement that every kind of technique should be permitted. We are the more ready 
to do so in view of the fact that the present interest in "thinking machines" has been 
aroused by a particular kind of machine, usually called an "electronic computer" or 
"digital computer." Following this suggestion we only permit digital computers to 
take part in our game. 
This restriction appears at first sight to be a very drastic one. I shall attempt to show 
that it is not so in reality. To do this necessitates a short account of the nature and 
properties of these computers. 
It may also be said that this identification of machines with digital computers, like our 
criterion for "thinking," will only be unsatisfactory if (contrary to my belief), it turns 
out that digital computers are unable to give a good showing in the game. 
There are already a number of digital computers in working order, and it may be 
asked, "Why not try the experiment straight away? It would be easy to satisfy the 
conditions of the game. A number of interrogators could be used, and statistics 
compiled to show how often the right identification was given." The short answer is 
that we are not asking whether all digital computers would do well in the game nor 
whether the computers at present available would do well, but whether there are 
imaginable computers which would do well. But this is only the short answer. We 
shall see this question in a different light later. 
4. Digital Computers 
The idea behind digital computers may be explained by saying that these machines 
are intended to carry out any operations which could be done by a human computer. 
The human computer is supposed to be following fixed rules; he has no authority to 
deviate from them in any detail. We may suppose that these rules are supplied in a 
book, which is altered whenever he is put on to a new job. He has also an unlimited 
supply of paper on which he does his calculations. He may also do his multiplications 
and additions on a "desk machine," but this is not important. 
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If we use the above explanation as a definition we shall be in danger of circularity of 
argument. We avoid this by giving an outline. of the means by which the desired 
effect is achieved. A digital computer can usually be regarded as consisting of three 
parts: 
(i) Store. 
(ii) Executive unit. 
(iii) Control. 
The store is a store of information, and corresponds to the human computer's paper, 
whether this is the paper on which he does his calculations or that on which his book 
of rules is printed. In so far as the human computer does calculations in his bead a 
part of the store will correspond to his memory. 
The executive unit is the part which carries out the various individual operations 
involved in a calculation. What these individual operations are will vary from 
machine to machine. Usually fairly lengthy operations can be done such as "Multiply 
3540675445 by 7076345687" but in some machines only very simple ones such as 
"Write down 0" are possible.  
We have mentioned that the "book of rules" supplied to the computer is replaced in 
the machine by a part of the store. It is then called the "table of instructions." It is the 
duty of the control to see that these instructions are obeyed correctly and in the right 
order. The control is so constructed that this necessarily happens. 
The information in the store is usually broken up into packets of moderately small 
size. In one machine, for instance, a packet might consist of ten decimal digits. 
Numbers are assigned to the parts of the store in which the various packets of 
information are stored, in some systematic manner. A typical instruction might say- 
"Add the number stored in position 6809 to that in 4302 and put the result back into 
the latter storage position."  
Needless to say it would not occur in the machine expressed in English. It would 
more likely be coded in a form such as 6809430217. Here 17 says which of various 
possible operations is to be performed on the two numbers. In this case the)e 
operation is that described above, viz., "Add the number. . . ." It will be noticed that 
the instruction takes up 10 digits and so forms one packet of information, very 
conveniently. The control will normally take the instructions to be obeyed in the order 
of the positions in which they are stored, but occasionally an instruction such as 
"Now obey the instruction stored in position 5606, and continue from there" 
may be encountered, or again 
"If position 4505 contains 0 obey next the instruction stored in 6707, otherwise 
continue straight on." 
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Instructions of these latter types are very important because they make it possible for 
a sequence of operations to be replaced over and over again until some condition is 
fulfilled, but in doing so to obey, not fresh instructions on each repetition, but the 
same ones over and over again. To take a domestic analogy. Suppose Mother wants 
Tommy to call at the cobbler's every morning on his way to school to see if her shoes 
are done, she can ask him afresh every morning. Alternatively she can stick up a 
notice once and for all in the hall which he will see when he leaves for school and 
which tells him to call for the shoes, and also to destroy the notice when he comes 
back if he has the shoes with him. 
The reader must accept it as a fact that digital computers can be constructed, and 
indeed have been constructed, according to the principles we have described, and that 
they can in fact mimic the actions of a human computer very closely. 
The book of rules which we have described our human computer as using is of course 
a convenient fiction. Actual human computers really remember what they have got to 
do. If one wants to make a machine mimic the behaviour of the human computer in 
some complex operation one has to ask him how it is done, and then translate the 
answer into the form of an instruction table. Constructing instruction tables is usually 
described as "programming." To "programme a machine to carry out the operation A" 
means to put the appropriate instruction table into the machine so that it will do A. 
An interesting variant on the idea of a digital computer is a "digital computer with a 
random element." These have instructions involving the throwing of a die or some 
equivalent electronic process; one such instruction might for instance be, "Throw the 
die and put the-resulting number into store 1000." Sometimes such a machine is 
described as having free will (though I would not use this phrase myself), It is not 
normally possible to determine from observing a machine whether it has a random 
element, for a similar effect can be produced by such devices as making the choices 
depend on the digits of the decimal for . 
Most actual digital computers have only a finite store. There is no theoretical 
difficulty in the idea of a computer with an unlimited store. Of course only a finite 
part can have been used at any one time. Likewise only a finite amount can have been 
constructed, but we can imagine more and more being added as required. Such 
computers have special theoretical interest and will be called infinitive capacity 
computers. 
The idea of a digital computer is an old one. Charles Babbage, Lucasian Professor of 
Mathematics at Cambridge from 1828 to 1839, planned such a machine, called the 
Analytical Engine, but it was never completed. Although Babbage had all the 
essential ideas, his machine was not at that time such a very attractive prospect. The 
speed which would have been available would be definitely faster than a human 
computer but something like I 00 times slower than the Manchester machine, itself 
one of the slower of the modern machines, The storage was to be purely mechanical, 
using wheels and cards. 
The fact that Babbage's Analytical Engine was to be entirely mechanical will help us 
to rid ourselves of a superstition. Importance is often attached to the fact that modern 
digital computers are electrical, and that the nervous system also is electrical. Since 
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Babbage's machine was not electrical, and since all digital computers are in a sense 
equivalent, we see that this use of electricity cannot be of theoretical importance. Of 
course electricity usually comes in where fast signalling is concerned, so that it is not 
surprising that we find it in both these connections. In the nervous system chemical 
phenomena are at least as important as electrical. In certain computers the storage 
system is mainly acoustic. The feature of using electricity is thus seen to be only a 
very superficial similarity. If we wish to find such similarities we should took rather 
for mathematical analogies of function.  
5. Universality of Digital Computers 
The digital computers considered in the last section may be classified amongst the 
"discrete-state machines." These are the machines which move by sudden jumps or 
clicks from one quite definite state to another. These states are sufficiently different 
for the possibility of confusion between them to be ignored. Strictly speaking there, 
are no such machines. Everything really moves continuously. But there are many 
kinds of machine which can profitably be thought of as being discrete-state machines. 
For instance in considering the switches for a lighting system it is a convenient fiction 
that each switch must be definitely on or definitely off. There must be intermediate 
positions, but for most purposes we can forget about them. As an example of a 
discrete-state machine we might consider a wheel which clicks round through 120 
once a second, but may be stopped by a ]ever which can be operated from outside; in 
addition a lamp is to light in one of the positions of the wheel. This machine could be 
described abstractly as follows. The internal state of the machine (which is described 
by the position of the wheel) may be q1, q2 or q3. There is an input signal i0. or i1 
(position of ]ever). The internal state at any moment is determined by the last state 
and input signal according to the table 
(TABLE DELETED) 
 The output signals, the only externally visible indication of the internal state (the 
light) are described by the table 
State q1 q2 q3 
output o0 o0 o1 
This example is typical of discrete-state machines. They can be described by such 
tables provided they have only a finite number of possible states. 
It will seem that given the initial state of the machine and the input signals it is always 
possible to predict all future states, This is reminiscent of Laplace's view that from the 
complete state of the universe at one moment of time, as described by the positions 
and velocities of all particles, it should be possible to predict all future states. The 
prediction which we are considering is, however, rather nearer to practicability than 
that considered by Laplace. The system of the "universe as a whole" is such that quite 
small errors in the initial conditions can have an overwhelming effect at a later time. 
The displacement of a single electron by a billionth of a centimetre at one moment 
might make the difference between a man being killed by an avalanche a year later, or 
escaping. It is an essential property of the mechanical systems which we have called 
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"discrete-state machines" that this phenomenon does not occur. Even when we 
consider the actual physical machines instead of the idealised machines, reasonably 
accurate knowledge of the state at one moment yields reasonably accurate knowledge 
any number of steps later.  
As we have mentioned, digital computers fall within the class of discrete-state 
machines. But the number of states of which such a machine is capable is usually 
enormously large. For instance, the number for the machine now working at 
Manchester is about 2 165,000, i.e., about 10 50,000. Compare this with our example of 
the clicking wheel described above, which had three states. It is not difficult to see 
why the number of states should be so immense. The computer includes a store 
corresponding to the paper used by a human computer. It must be possible to write 
into the store any one of the combinations of symbols which might have been written 
on the paper. For simplicity suppose that only digits from 0 to 9 are used as symbols. 
Variations in handwriting are ignored. Suppose the computer is allowed 100 sheets of 
paper each containing 50 lines each with room for 30 digits. Then the number of 
states is 10 100x50x30 i.e., 10 150,000 . This is about the number of states of three 
Manchester machines put together. The logarithm to the base two of the number of 
states is usually called the "storage capacity" of the machine. Thus the Manchester 
machine has a storage capacity of about 165,000 and the wheel machine of our 
example about 1.6. If two machines are put together their capacities must be added to 
obtain the capacity of the resultant machine. This leads to the possibility of statements 
such as "The Manchester machine contains 64 magnetic tracks each with a capacity of 
2560, eight electronic tubes with a capacity of 1280. Miscellaneous storage amounts 
to about 300 making a total of 174,380."  
Given the table corresponding to a discrete-state machine it is possible to predict what 
it will do. There is no reason why this calculation should not be carried out by means 
of a digital computer. Provided it could be carried out sufficiently quickly the digital 
computer could mimic the behavior of any discrete-state machine. The imitation game 
could then be played with the machine in question (as B) and the mimicking digital 
computer (as A) and the interrogator would be unable to distinguish them. Of course 
the digital computer must have an adequate storage capacity as well as working 
sufficiently fast. Moreover, it must be programmed afresh for each new machine 
which it is desired to mimic. 
This special property of digital computers, that they can mimic any discrete-state 
machine, is described by saying that they are universal machines. The existence of 
machines with this property has the important consequence that, considerations of 
speed apart, it is unnecessary to design various new machines to do various 
computing processes. They can all be done with one digital computer, suitably 
programmed for each case. It 'ill be seen that as a consequence of this all digital 
computers are in a sense equivalent. 
We may now consider again the point raised at the end of §3. It was suggested 
tentatively that the question, "Can machines think?" should be replaced by "Are there 
imaginable digital computers which would do well in the imitation game?" If we wish 
we can make this superficially more general and ask "Are there discrete-state 
machines which would do well?" But in view of the universality property we see that 
either of these questions is equivalent to this, "Let us fix our attention on one 
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particular digital computer C. Is it true that by modifying this computer to have an 
adequate storage, suitably increasing its speed of action, and providing it with an 
appropriate programme, C can be made to play satisfactorily the part of A in the 
imitation game, the part of B being taken by a man?" 
6. Contrary Views on the Main Question 
We may now consider the ground to have been cleared and we are ready to proceed to 
the debate on our question, "Can machines think?" and the variant of it quoted at the 
end of the last section. We cannot altogether abandon the original form of the 
problem, for opinions will differ as to the appropriateness of the substitution and we 
must at least listen to what has to be said in this connexion. 
It will simplify matters for the reader if I explain first my own beliefs in the matter. 
Consider first the more accurate form of the question. I believe that in about fifty 
years' time it will be possible, to programme computers, with a storage capacity of 
about 109, to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator 
will not have more than 70 per cent chance of making the right identification after 
five minutes of questioning. The original question, "Can machines think?" I believe to 
be too meaningless to deserve discussion. Nevertheless I believe that at the end of the 
century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that 
one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted. I 
believe further that no useful purpose is served by concealing these beliefs. The 
popular view that scientists proceed inexorably from well-established fact to well-
established fact, never being influenced by any improved conjecture, is quite 
mistaken. Provided it is made clear which are proved facts and which are conjectures, 
no harm can result. Conjectures are of great importance since they suggest useful 
lines of research.  
I now proceed to consider opinions opposed to my own. 
(1) The Theological Objection 
Thinking is a function of man's immortal soul. God has given an immortal soul to 
every man and woman, but not to any other animal or to machines. Hence no animal 
or machine can think. 
I am unable to accept any part of this, but will attempt to reply in theological terms. I 
should find the argument more convincing if animals were classed with men, for there 
is a greater difference, to my mind, between the typical animate and the inanimate 
than there is between man and the other animals. The arbitrary character of the 
orthodox view becomes clearer if we consider how it might appear to a member of 
some other religious community. How do Christians regard the Moslem view that 
women have no souls? But let us leave this point aside and return to the main 
argument. It appears to me that the argument quoted above implies a serious 
restriction of the omnipotence of the Almighty. It is admitted that there are certain 
things that He cannot do such as making one equal to two, but should we not believe 
that He has freedom to confer a soul on an elephant if He sees fit? We might expect 
that He would only exercise this power in conjunction with a mutation which 
provided the elephant with an appropriately improved brain to minister to the needs of 
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this sort[. An argument of exactly similar form may be made for the case of machines. 
It may seem different because it is more difficult to "swallow." But this really only 
means that we think it would be less likely that He would consider the circumstances 
suitable for conferring a soul. The circumstances in question are discussed in the rest 
of this paper. In attempting to construct such machines we should not be irreverently 
usurping His power of creating souls, any more than we are in the procreation of 
children: rather we are, in either case, instruments of His will providing .mansions for 
the souls that He creates. 
However, this is mere speculation. I am not very impressed with theological 
arguments whatever they may be used to support. Such arguments have often been 
found unsatisfactory in the past. In the time of Galileo it was argued that the texts, 
"And the sun stood still . . . and hasted not to go down about a whole day" (Joshua x. 
13) and "He laid the foundations of the earth, that it should not move at any time" 
(Psalm cv. 5) were an adequate refutation of the Copernican theory. With our present 
knowledge such an argument appears futile. When that knowledge was not available 
it made a quite different impression.  
(2) The "Heads in the Sand" Objection  
The consequences of machines thinking would be too dreadful. Let us hope and 
believe that they cannot do so."  
This argument is seldom expressed quite so openly as in the form above. But it affects 
most of us who think about it at all. We like to believe that Man is in some subtle way 
superior to the rest of creation. It is best if he can be shown to be necessarily superior, 
for then there is no danger of him losing his commanding position. The popularity of 
the theological argument is clearly connected with this feeling. It is likely to be quite 
strong in intellectual people, since they value the power of thinking more highly than 
others, and are more inclined to base their belief in the superiority of Man on this 
power.  
I do not think that this argument is sufficiently substantial to require refutation. 
Consolation would be more appropriate: perhaps this should be sought in the 
transmigration of souls. 
(3) The Mathematical Objection 
There are a number of results of mathematical logic which can be used to show that 
there are limitations to the powers of discrete-state machines. The best known of these 
results is known as Godel's theorem ( 1931 ) and shows that in any sufficiently 
powerful logical system statements can be formulated which can neither be proved 
nor disproved within the system, unless possibly the system itself is inconsistent. 
There are other, in some respects similar, results due to Church (1936), Kleene 
(1935), Rosser, and Turing (1937). The latter result is the most convenient to 
consider, since it refers directly to machines, whereas the others can only be used in a 
comparatively indirect argument: for instance if Godel's theorem is to be used we 
need in addition to have some means of describing logical systems in terms of 
machines, and machines in terms of logical systems. The result in question refers to a 
type of machine which is essentially a digital computer with an infinite capacity. It 
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states that there are certain things that such a machine cannot do. If it is rigged up to 
give answers to questions as in the imitation game, there will be some questions to 
which it will either give a wrong answer, or fail to give an answer at all however 
much time is allowed for a reply. There may, of course, be many such questions, and 
questions which cannot be answered by one machine may be satisfactorily answered 
by another. We are of course supposing for the present that the questions are of the 
kind to which an answer "Yes" or "No" is appropriate, rather than questions such as 
"What do you think of Picasso?" The questions that we know the machines must fail 
on are of this type, "Consider the machine specified as follows. . . . Will this machine 
ever answer 'Yes' to any question?" The dots are to be replaced by a description of 
some machine in a standard form, which could be something like that used in §5. 
When the machine described bears a certain comparatively simple relation to the 
machine which is under interrogation, it can be shown that the answer is either wrong 
or not forthcoming. This is the mathematical result: it is argued that it proves a 
disability of machines to which the human intellect is not subject. 
The short answer to this argument is that although it is established that there are 
limitations to the Powers If any particular machine, it has only been stated, without 
any sort of proof, that no such limitations apply to the human intellect. But I do not 
think this view can be dismissed quite so lightly. Whenever one of these machines is 
asked the appropriate critical question, and gives a definite answer, we know that this 
answer must be wrong, and this gives us a certain feeling of superiority. Is this feeling 
illusory? It is no doubt quite genuine, but I do not think too much importance should 
be attached to it. We too often give wrong answers to questions ourselves to be 
justified in being very pleased at such evidence of fallibility on the part of the 
machines. Further, our superiority can only be felt on such an occasion in relation to 
the one machine over which we have scored our petty triumph. There would be no 
question of triumphing simultaneously over all machines. In short, then, there might 
be men cleverer than any given machine, but then again there might be other 
machines cleverer again, and so on. 
Those who hold to the mathematical argument would, I think, mostly he willing to 
accept the imitation game as a basis for discussion, Those who believe in the two 
previous objections would probably not be interested in any criteria. 
(4) The Argument from Consciousness 
This argument is very, well expressed in Professor Jefferson's Lister Oration for 1949, 
from which I quote. "Not until a machine can write a sonnet or compose a concerto 
because of thoughts and emotions felt, and not by the chance fall of symbols, could 
we agree that machine equals brain-that is, not only write it but know that it had 
written it. No mechanism could feel (and not merely artificially signal, an easy 
contrivance) pleasure at its successes, grief when its valves fuse, be warmed by 
flattery, be made miserable by its mistakes, be charmed by sex, be angry or depressed 
when it cannot get what it wants." 
This argument appears to be a denial of the validity of our test. According to the most 
extreme form of this view the only way by which one could be sure that machine 
thinks is to be the machine and to feel oneself thinking. One could then describe these 
feelings to the world, but of course no one would be justified in taking any notice. 
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Likewise according to this view the only way to know that a man thinks is to be that 
particular man. It is in fact the solipsist point of view. It may be the most logical view 
to hold but it makes communication of ideas difficult. A is liable to believe "A thinks 
but B does not" whilst B believes "B thinks but A does not." instead of arguing 
continually over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone 
thinks. 
I am sure that Professor Jefferson does not wish to adopt the extreme and solipsist 
point of view. Probably he would be quite willing to accept the imitation game as a 
test. The game (with the player B omitted) is frequently used in practice under the 
name of viva voce to discover whether some one really understands something or has 
"learnt it parrot fashion." Let us listen in to a part of such a viva voce: 
Interrogator: In the first line of your sonnet which reads "Shall I compare thee to a 
summer's day," would not "a spring day" do as well or better? 
Witness: It wouldn't scan. 
Interrogator: How about "a winter's day," That would scan all right. 
Witness: Yes, but nobody wants to be compared to a winter's day. 
Interrogator: Would you say Mr. Pickwick reminded you of Christmas? 
Witness: In a way. 
Interrogator: Yet Christmas is a winter's day, and I do not think Mr. Pickwick would 
mind the comparison. 
Witness: I don't think you're serious. By a winter's day one means a typical winter's 
day, rather than a special one like Christmas. 
And so on, What would Professor Jefferson say if the sonnet-writing machine was 
able to answer like this in the viva voce? I do not know whether he would regard the 
machine as "merely artificially signalling" these answers, but if the answers were as 
satisfactory and sustained as in the above passage I do not think he would describe it 
as "an easy contrivance." This phrase is, I think, intended to cover such devices as the 
inclusion in the machine of a record of someone reading a sonnet, with appropriate 
switching to turn it on from time to time. 
In short then, I think that most of those who support the argument from consciousness 
could be persuaded to abandon it rather than be forced into the solipsist position. They 
will then probably be willing to accept our test. 
I do not wish to give the impression that I think there is no mystery about 
consciousness. There is, for instance, something of a paradox connected with any 
attempt to localise it. But I do not think these mysteries necessarily need to be solved 
before we can answer the question with which we are concerned in this paper. 
(5) Arguments from Various Disabilities 
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These arguments take the form, "I grant you that you can make machines do all the 
things you have mentioned but you will never be able to make one to do X." 
Numerous features X are suggested in this connexion I offer a selection:  
Be kind, resourceful, beautiful, friendly, have initiative, have a sense of humour, tell 
right from wrong, make mistakes, fall in love, enjoy strawberries and cream, make 
some one fall in love with it, learn from experience, use words properly, be the 
subject of its own thought, have as much diversity of behaviour as a man, do 
something really new. 
No support is usually offered for these statements. I believe they are mostly founded 
on the principle of scientific induction. A man has seen thousands of machines in his 
lifetime. From what he sees of them he draws a number of general conclusions. They 
are ugly, each is designed for a very limited purpose, when required for a minutely 
different purpose they are useless, the variety of behaviour of any one of them is very 
small, etc., etc. Naturally he concludes that these are necessary properties of machines 
in general. Many of these limitations are associated with the very small storage 
capacity of most machines. (I am assuming that the idea of storage capacity is 
extended in some way to cover machines other than discrete-state machines. The 
exact definition does not matter as no mathematical accuracy is claimed in the present 
discussion,) A few years ago, when very little had been heard of digital computers, it 
was possible to elicit much incredulity concerning them, if one mentioned their 
properties without describing their construction. That was presumably due to a similar 
application of the principle of scientific induction. These applications of the principle 
are of course largely unconscious. When a burnt child fears the fire and shows that he 
fears it by avoiding it, f should say that he was applying scientific induction. (I could 
of course also describe his behaviour in many other ways.) The works and customs of 
mankind do not seem to be very suitable material to which to apply scientific 
induction. A very large part of space-time must be investigated, if reliable results are 
to be obtained. Otherwise we may (as most English 'Children do) decide that 
everybody speaks English, and that it is silly to learn French.  
There are, however, special remarks to be made about many of the disabilities that 
have been mentioned. The inability to enjoy strawberries and cream may have struck 
the reader as frivolous. Possibly a machine might be made to enjoy this delicious dish, 
but any attempt to make one do so would be idiotic. What is important about this 
disability is that it contributes to some of the other disabilities, e.g., to the difficulty of 
the same kind of friendliness occurring between man and machine as between white 
man and white man, or between black man and black man. 
The claim that "machines cannot make mistakes" seems a curious one. One is tempted 
to retort, "Are they any the worse for that?" But let us adopt a more sympathetic 
attitude, and try to see what is really meant. I think this criticism can be explained in 
terms of the imitation game. It is claimed that the interrogator could distinguish the 
machine from the man simply by setting them a number of problems in arithmetic. 
The machine would be unmasked because of its deadly accuracy. The reply to this is 
simple. The machine (programmed for playing the game) would not attempt to give 
the right answers to the arithmetic problems. It would deliberately introduce mistakes 
in a manner calculated to confuse the interrogator. A mechanical fault would probably 
show itself through an unsuitable decision as to what sort of a mistake to make in the 
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arithmetic. Even this interpretation of the criticism is not sufficiently sympathetic. But 
we cannot afford the space to go into it much further. It seems to me that this criticism 
depends on a confusion between two kinds of mistake, We may call them "errors of 
functioning" and "errors of conclusion." Errors of functioning are due to some 
mechanical or electrical fault which causes the machine to behave otherwise than it 
was designed to do. In philosophical discussions one likes to ignore the possibility of 
such errors; one is therefore discussing "abstract machines." These abstract machines 
are mathematical fictions rather than physical objects. By definition they are 
incapable of errors of functioning. In this sense we can truly say that "machines can 
never make mistakes." Errors of conclusion can only arise when some meaning is 
attached to the output signals from the machine. The machine might, for instance, 
type out mathematical equations, or sentences in English. When a false proposition is 
typed we say that the machine has committed an error of conclusion. There is clearly 
no reason at all for saying that a machine cannot make this kind of mistake. It might 
do nothing but type out repeatedly "O = I." To take a less perverse example, it might 
have some method for drawing conclusions by scientific induction. We must expect 
such a method to lead occasionally to erroneous results. 
The claim that a machine cannot be the subject of its own thought can of course only 
be answered if it can be shown that the machine has some thought with some subject 
matter. Nevertheless, "the subject matter of a machine's operations" does seem to 
mean something, at least to the people who deal with it. If, for instance, the machine 
was trying to find a solution of the equation x2 - 40x - 11 = 0 one would be tempted 
to describe this equation as part of the machine's subject matter at that moment. In this 
sort of sense a machine undoubtedly can be its own subject matter. It may be used to 
help in making up its own programmes, or to predict the effect of alterations in its 
own structure. By observing the results of its own behaviour it can modify its own 
programmes so as to achieve some purpose more effectively. These are possibilities 
of the near future, rather than Utopian dreams. 
The criticism that a machine cannot have much diversity of behaviour is just a way of 
saying that it cannot have much storage capacity. Until fairly recently a storage 
capacity of even a thousand digits was very rare.  
The criticisms that we are considering here are often disguised forms of the argument 
from consciousness, Usually if one maintains that a machine can do one of these 
things, and describes the kind of method that the machine could use, one will not 
make much of an impression. It is thought that tile method (whatever it may be, for it 
must be mechanical) is really rather base. Compare the parentheses in Jefferson's 
statement quoted on page 22. 
(6) Lady Lovelace's Objection 
Our most detailed information of Babbage's Analytical Engine comes from a memoir 
by Lady Lovelace ( 1842). In it she states, "The Analytical Engine has no pretensions 
to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform" (her 
italics). This statement is quoted by Hartree ( 1949) who adds: "This does not imply 
that it may not be possible to construct electronic equipment which will 'think for 
itself,' or in which, in biological terms, one could set up a conditioned reflex, which 
would serve as a basis for 'learning.' Whether this is possible in principle or not is a 
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stimulating and exciting question, suggested by some of these recent developments 
But it did not seem that the machines constructed or projected at the time had this 
property." 
I am in thorough agreement with Hartree over this. It will be noticed that he does not 
assert that the machines in question had not got the property, but rather that the 
evidence available to Lady Lovelace did not encourage her to believe that they had it. 
It is quite possible that the machines in question had in a sense got this property. For 
suppose that some discrete-state machine has the property. The Analytical Engine was 
a universal digital computer, so that, if its storage capacity and speed were adequate, 
it could by suitable programming be made to mimic the machine in question. 
Probably this argument did not occur to the Countess or to Babbage. In any case there 
was no obligation on them to claim all that could be claimed. 
This whole question will be considered again under the heading of learning machines. 
A variant of Lady Lovelace's objection states that a machine can "never do anything 
really new." This may be parried for a moment with the saw, "There is nothing new 
under the sun." Who can be certain that "original work" that he has done was not 
simply the growth of the seed planted in him by teaching, or the effect of following 
well-known general principles. A better variant of the objection says that a machine 
can never "take us by surprise." This statement is a more direct challenge and can be 
met directly. Machines take me by surprise with great frequency. This is largely 
because I do not do sufficient calculation to decide what to expect them to do, or 
rather because, although I do a calculation, I do it in a hurried, slipshod fashion, 
taking risks. Perhaps I say to myself, "I suppose the Voltage here ought to he the same 
as there: anyway let's assume it is." Naturally I am often wrong, and the result is a 
surprise for me for by the time the experiment is done these assumptions have been 
forgotten. These admissions lay me open to lectures on the subject of my vicious 
ways, but do not throw any doubt on my credibility when I testify to the surprises I 
experience. 
I do not expect this reply to silence my critic. He will probably say that h surprises are 
due to some creative mental act on my part, and reflect no credit on the machine. This 
leads us back to the argument from consciousness, and far from the idea of surprise. It 
is a line of argument we must consider closed, but it is perhaps worth remarking that 
the appreciation of something as surprising requires as much of a "creative mental 
act" whether the surprising event originates from a man, a book, a machine or 
anything else. 
The view that machines cannot give rise to surprises is due, I believe, to a fallacy to 
which philosophers and mathematicians are particularly subject. This is the 
assumption that as soon as a fact is presented to a mind all consequences of that fact 
spring into the mind simultaneously with it. It is a very useful assumption under many 
circumstances, but one too easily forgets that it is false. A natural consequence of 
doing so is that one then assumes that there is no virtue in the mere working out of 
consequences from data and general principles. 
(7) Argument from Continuity in the Nervous System  
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The nervous system is certainly not a discrete-state machine. A small error in the 
information about the size of a nervous impulse impinging on a neuron, may make a 
large difference to the size of the outgoing impulse. It may be argued that, this being 
so, one cannot expect to be able to mimic the behaviour of the nervous system with a 
discrete-state system. 
It is true that a discrete-state machine must be different from a continuous machine. 
But if we adhere to the conditions of the imitation game, the interrogator will not be 
able to take any advantage of this difference. The situation can be made clearer if we 
consider sonic other simpler continuous machine. A differential analyser will do very 
well. (A differential analyser is a certain kind of machine not of the discrete-state type 
used for some kinds of calculation.) Some of these provide their answers in a typed 
form, and so are suitable for taking part in the game. It would not be possible for a 
digital computer to predict exactly what answers the differential analyser would give 
to a problem, but it would be quite capable of giving the right sort of answer. For 
instance, if asked to give the value of (actually about 3.1416) it would be reasonable 
to choose at random between the values 3.12, 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16 with the 
probabilities of 0.05, 0.15, 0.55, 0.19, 0.06 (say). Under these circumstances it would 
be very difficult for the interrogator to distinguish the differential analyser from the 
digital computer.  
(8) The Argument from Informality of Behaviour  
It is not possible to produce a set of rules purporting to describe what a man should do 
in every conceivable set of circumstances. One might for instance have a rule that one 
is to stop when one sees a red traffic light, and to go if one sees a green one, but what 
if by some fault both appear together? One may perhaps decide that it is safest to stop. 
But some further difficulty may well arise from this decision later. To attempt to 
provide rules of conduct to cover every eventuality, even those arising from traffic 
lights, appears to be impossible. With all this I agree. 
From this it is argued that we cannot be machines. I shall try to reproduce the 
argument, but I fear I shall hardly do it justice. It seems to run something like this. "if 
each man had a definite set of rules of conduct by which he regulated his life he 
would be no better than a machine. But there are no such rules, so men cannot be 
machines." The undistributed middle is glaring. I do not think the argument is ever 
put quite like this, but I believe this is the argument used nevertheless. There may 
however be a certain confusion between "rules of conduct" and "laws of behaviour" to 
cloud the issue. By "rules of conduct" I mean precepts such as "Stop if you see red 
lights," on which one can act, and of which one can be conscious. By "laws of 
behaviour" I mean laws of nature as applied to a man's body such as "if you pinch him 
he will squeak." If we substitute "laws of behaviour which regulate his life" for "laws 
of conduct by which he regulates his life" in the argument quoted the undistributed 
middle is no longer insuperable. For we believe that it is not only true that being 
regulated by laws of behaviour implies being some sort of machine (though not 
necessarily a discrete-state machine), but that conversely being such a machine 
implies being regulated by such laws. However, we cannot so easily convince 
ourselves of the absence of complete laws of behaviour as of complete rules of 
conduct. The only way we know of for finding such laws is scientific observation, and 
we certainly know of no circumstances under which we could say, "We have searched 
 78 
enough. There are no such laws." 
We can demonstrate more forcibly that any such statement would be unjustified. For 
suppose we could be sure of finding such laws if they existed. Then given a discrete-
state machine it should certainly be possible to discover by observation sufficient 
about it to predict its future behaviour, and this within a reasonable time, say a 
thousand years. But this does not seem to be the case. I have set up on the Manchester 
computer a small programme using only 1,000 units of storage, whereby the machine 
supplied with one sixteen-figure number replies with another within two seconds. I 
would defy anyone to learn from these replies sufficient about the programme to be 
able to predict any replies to untried values. 
(9) The Argument from Extrasensory Perception  
I assume that the reader is familiar with the idea of extrasensory perception, and the 
meaning of the four items of it, viz., telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition and 
psychokinesis. These disturbing phenomena seem to deny all our usual scientific 
ideas. How we should like to discredit them! Unfortunately the statistical evidence, at 
least for telepathy, is overwhelming. It is very difficult to rearrange one's ideas so as 
to fit these new facts in. Once one has accepted them it does not seem a very big step 
to believe in ghosts and bogies. The idea that our bodies move simply according to 
the known laws of physics, together with some others not yet discovered but 
somewhat similar, would be one of the first to go. 
This argument is to my mind quite a strong one. One can say in reply that many 
scientific theories seem to remain workable in practice, in spite of clashing with ESP; 
that in fact one can get along very nicely if one forgets about it. This is rather cold 
comfort, and one fears that thinking is just the kind of phenomenon where ESP may 
be especially relevant. 
A more specific argument based on ESP might run as follows: "Let us play the 
imitation game, using as witnesses a man who is good as a telepathic receiver, and a 
digital computer. The interrogator can ask such questions as 'What suit does the card 
in my right hand belong to?' The man by telepathy or clairvoyance gives the right 
answer 130 times out of 400 cards. The machine can only guess at random, and 
perhaps gets 104 right, so the interrogator makes the right identification." There is an 
interesting possibility which opens here. Suppose the digital computer contains a 
random number generator. Then it will be natural to use this to decide what answer to 
give. But then the random number generator will be subject to the psychokinetic 
powers of the interrogator. Perhaps this psychokinesis might cause the machine to 
guess right more often than would be expected on a probability calculation, so that the 
interrogator might still be unable to make the right identification. On the other hand, 
he might be able to guess right without any questioning, by clairvoyance. With ESP 
anything may happen. 
If telepathy is admitted it will be necessary to tighten our test up. The situation could 
be regarded as analogous to that which would occur if the interrogator were talking to 
himself and one of the competitors was listening with his ear to the wall. To put the 
competitors into a "telepathy-proof room" would satisfy all requirements. 
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7. Learning Machines 
The reader will have anticipated that I have no very convincing arguments of a 
positive nature to support my views. If I had I should not have taken such pains to 
point out the fallacies in contrary views. Such evidence as I have I shall now give. 
Let us return for a moment to Lady Lovelace's objection, which stated that the 
machine can only do what we tell it to do. One could say that a man can "inject" an 
idea into the machine, and that it will respond to a certain extent and then drop into 
quiescence, like a piano string struck by a hammer. Another simile would be an 
atomic pile of less than critical size: an injected idea is to correspond to a neutron 
entering the pile from without. Each such neutron will cause a certain disturbance 
which eventually dies away. If, however, the size of the pile is sufficiently increased, 
tire disturbance caused by such an incoming neutron will very likely go on and on 
increasing until the whole pile is destroyed. Is there a corresponding phenomenon for 
minds, and is there one for machines? There does seem to be one for the human mind. 
The majority of them seem to be "subcritical," i.e., to correspond in this analogy to 
piles of subcritical size. An idea presented to such a mind will on average give rise to 
less than one idea in reply. A smallish proportion are supercritical. An idea presented 
to such a mind that may give rise to a whole "theory" consisting of secondary, tertiary 
and more remote ideas. Animals minds seem to be very definitely subcritical. 
Adhering to this analogy we ask, "Can a machine be made to be supercritical?" 
The "skin-of-an-onion" analogy is also helpful. In considering the functions of the 
mind or the brain we find certain operations which we can explain in purely 
mechanical terms. This we say does not correspond to the real mind: it is a sort of 
skin which we must strip off if we are to find the real mind. But then in what remains 
we find a further skin to be stripped off, and so on. Proceeding in this way do we ever 
come to the "real" mind, or do we eventually come to the skin which has nothing in 
it? In the latter case the whole mind is mechanical. (It would not be a discrete-state 
machine however. We have discussed this.) 
These last two paragraphs do not claim to be convincing arguments. They should 
rather be described as "recitations tending to produce belief." 
The only really satisfactory support that can be given for the view expressed at the 
beginning of §6, will be that provided by waiting for the end of the century and then 
doing the experiment described. But what can we say in the meantime? What steps 
should be taken now if the experiment is to be successful?  
As I have explained, the problem is mainly one of programming. Advances in 
engineering will have to be made too, but it seems unlikely that these will not be 
adequate for the requirements. Estimates of the storage capacity of the brain vary 
from 1010 to 1015 binary digits. I incline to the lower values and believe that only a 
very small fraction is used for the higher types of thinking. Most of it is probably used 
for the retention of visual impressions, I should be surprised if more than 109 was 
required for satisfactory playing of the imitation game, at any rate against a blind 
man. (Note: The capacity of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition, is 2 X 109) A 
storage capacity of 107, would be a very practicable possibility even by present 
techniques. It is probably not necessary to increase the speed of operations of the 
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machines at all. Parts of modern machines which can be regarded as analogs of nerve 
cells work about a thousand times faster than the latter. This should provide a "margin 
of safety" which could cover losses of speed arising in many ways, Our problem then 
is to find out how to programme these machines to play the game. At my present rate 
of working I produce about a thousand digits of progratiirne a day, so that about sixty 
workers, working steadily through the fifty years might accomplish the job, if nothing 
went into the wastepaper basket. Some more expeditious method seems desirable. 
In the process of trying to imitate an adult human mind we are bound to think a good 
deal about the process which has brought it to the state that it is in. We may notice 
three components. 
(a) The initial state of the mind, say at birth,  
(b) The education to which it has been subjected,  
(c) Other experience, not to be described as education, to which it has been subjected. 
Instead of trying to produce a programme to simulate the adult mind, why not rather 
try to produce one which simulates the child's? If this were then subjected to an 
appropriate course of education one would obtain the adult brain. Presumably the 
child brain is something like a notebook as one buys it from the stationer's. Rather 
little mechanism, and lots of blank sheets. (Mechanism and writing are from our point 
of view almost synonymous.) Our hope is that there is so little mechanism in the child 
brain that something like it can be easily programmed. The amount of work in the 
education we can assume, as a first approximation, to be much the same as for the 
human child. 
We have thus divided our problem into two parts. The child programme and the 
education process. These two remain very closely connected. We cannot expect to 
find a good child machine at the first attempt. One must experiment with teaching one 
such machine and see how well it learns. One can then try another and see if it is 
better or worse. There is an obvious connection between this process and evolution, 
by the identifications  
Structure of the child machine = hereditary material  
Changes of the child machine = mutation, 
Natural selection = judgment of the experimenter  
One may hope, however, that this process will be more expeditious than evolution. 
The survival of the fittest is a slow method for measuring advantages. The 
experimenter, by the exercise of intelligence, should he able to speed it up. Equally 
important is the fact that he is not restricted to random mutations. If he can trace a 
cause for some weakness he can probably think of the kind of mutation which will 
improve it. 
It will not be possible to apply exactly the same teaching process to the machine as to 
a normal child. It will not, for instance, be provided with legs, so that it could not be 
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asked to go out and fill the coal scuttle. Possibly it might not have eyes. But however 
well these deficiencies might be overcome by clever engineering, one could not send 
the creature to school without the other children making excessive fun of it. It must be 
given some tuition. We need not be too concerned about the legs, eyes, etc. The 
example of Miss Helen Keller shows that education can take place provided that 
communication in both directions between teacher and pupil can take place by some 
means or other.  
We normally associate punishments and rewards with the teaching process. Some 
simple child machines can be constructed or programmed on this sort of principle. 
The machine has to be so constructed that events which shortly preceded the 
occurrence of a punishment signal are unlikely to be repeated, whereas a reward 
signal increased the probability of repetition of the events which led up to it. These 
definitions do not presuppose any feelings on the part of the machine, I have done 
some experiments with one such child machine, and succeeded in teaching it a few 
things, but the teaching method was too unorthodox for the experiment to be 
considered really successful. 
The use of punishments and rewards can at best be a part of the teaching process. 
Roughly speaking, if the teacher has no other means of communicating to the pupil, 
the amount of information which can reach him does not exceed the total number of 
rewards and punishments applied. By the time a child has learnt to repeat 
"Casabianca" he would probably feel very sore indeed, if the text could only be 
discovered by a "Twenty Questions" technique, every "NO" taking the form of a 
blow. It is necessary therefore to have some other "unemotional" channels of 
communication. If these are available it is possible to teach a machine by punishments 
and rewards to obey orders given in some language, e.g., a symbolic language. These 
orders are to be transmitted through the "unemotional" channels. The use of this 
language will diminish greatly the number of punishments and rewards required. 
Opinions may vary as to the complexity which is suitable in the child machine. One 
might try to make it as simple as possible consistently with the general principles. 
Alternatively one might have a complete system of logical inference "built in."' In the 
latter case the store would be largely occupied with definitions and propositions. The 
propositions would have various kinds of status, e.g., well-established facts, 
conjectures, mathematically proved theorems, statements given by an authority, 
expressions having the logical form of proposition but not belief-value. Certain 
propositions may be described as "imperatives." The machine should be so 
constructed that as soon as an imperative is classed as "well established" the 
appropriate action automatically takes place. To illustrate this, suppose the teacher 
says to the machine, "Do your homework now." This may cause "Teacher says 'Do 
your homework now' " to be included amongst the well-established facts. Another 
such fact might be, "Everything that teacher says is true." Combining these may 
eventually lead to the imperative, "Do your homework now," being included amongst 
the well-established facts, and this, by the construction of the machine, will mean that 
the homework actually gets started, but the effect is very satisfactory. The processes 
of inference used by the machine need not be such as would satisfy the most exacting 
logicians. There might for instance be no hierarchy of types. But this need not mean 
that type fallacies will occur, any more than we are bound to fall over unfenced cliffs. 
Suitable imperatives (expressed within the systems, not forming part of the rules of 
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the system) such as "Do not use a class unless it is a subclass of one which has been 
mentioned by teacher" can have a similar effect to "Do not go too near the edge." 
The imperatives that can be obeyed by a machine that has no limbs are bound to be of 
a rather intellectual character, as in the example (doing homework) given above. 
important amongst such imperatives will be ones which regulate the order in which 
the rules of the logical system concerned are to be applied, For at each stage when one 
is using a logical system, there is a very large number of alternative steps, any of 
which one is permitted to apply, so far as obedience to the rules of the logical system 
is concerned. These choices make the difference between a brilliant and a footling 
reasoner, not the difference between a sound and a fallacious one. Propositions 
leading to imperatives of this kind might be "When Socrates is mentioned, use the 
syllogism in Barbara" or "If one method has been proved to be quicker than another, 
do not use the slower method." Some of these may be "given by authority," but others 
may be produced by the machine itself, e.g. by scientific induction.  
The idea of a learning machine may appear paradoxical to some readers. How can the 
rules of operation of the machine change? They should describe completely how the 
machine will react whatever its history might be, whatever changes it might undergo. 
The rules are thus quite time-invariant. This is quite true. The explanation of the 
paradox is that the rules which get changed in the learning process are of a rather less 
pretentious kind, claiming only an ephemeral validity. The reader may draw a parallel 
with the Constitution of the United States. 
An important feature of a learning machine is that its teacher will often be very 
largely ignorant of quite what is going on inside, although he may still be able to 
some extent to predict his pupil's behavior. This should apply most strongly to the 
later education of a machine arising from a child machine of well-tried design (or 
programme). This is in clear contrast with normal procedure when using a machine to 
do computations one's object is then to have a clear mental picture of the state of the 
machine at each moment in the computation. This object can only be achieved with a 
struggle. The view that "the machine can only do what we know how to order it to 
do,"' appears strange in face of this. Most of the programmes which we can put into 
the machine will result in its doing something that we cannot make sense (if at all, or 
which we regard as completely random behaviour. Intelligent behaviour presumably 
consists in a departure from the completely disciplined behaviour involved in 
computation, but a rather slight one, which does not give rise to random behaviour, or 
to pointless repetitive loops. Another important result of preparing our machine for its 
part in the imitation game by a process of teaching and learning is that "human 
fallibility" is likely to be omitted in a rather natural way, i.e., without special 
"coaching." (The reader should reconcile this with the point of view on pages 23 and 
24.) Processes that are learnt do not produce a hundred per cent certainty of result; if 
they did they could not be unlearnt. 
It is probably wise to include a random element in a learning machine. A random 
element is rather useful when we are searching for a solution of some problem. 
Suppose for instance we wanted to find a number between 50 and 200 which was 
equal to the square of the sum of its digits, we might start at 51 then try 52 and go on 
until we got a number that worked. Alternatively we might choose numbers at random 
until we got a good one. This method has the advantage that it is unnecessary to keep 
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track of the values that have been tried, but the disadvantage that one may try the 
same one twice, but this is not very important if there are several solutions. The 
systematic method has the disadvantage that there may be an enormous block without 
any solutions in the region which has to be investigated first, Now the learning 
process may be regarded as a search for a form of behaviour which will satisfy the 
teacher (or some other criterion). Since there is probably a very large number of 
satisfactory solutions the random method seems to be better than the systematic. It 
should be noticed that it is used in the analogous process of evolution. But there the 
systematic method is not possible. How could one keep track of the different genetical 
combinations that had been tried, so as to avoid trying them again? 
We may hope that machines will eventually compete with men in all purely 
intellectual fields. But which are the best ones to start with? Even this is a difficult 
decision. Many people think that a very abstract activity, like the playing of chess, 
would be best. It can also be maintained that it is best to provide the machine with the 
best sense organs that money can buy, and then teach it to understand and speak 
English. This process could follow the normal teaching of a child. Things would be 
pointed out and named, etc. Again I do not know what the right answer is, but I think 
both approaches should be tried. 
We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be 
done. 
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